DISARMAMENT

Disarmament and Security in Africa

United Nations

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Department for Disarmament Affairs

DISARMAMENT

Disarmament and Security in Africa

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Introduction

The present publication contains selected papers presented at the seminars on African Disarmament and Security, which were held in Cairo, Egypt, from 20 to 23 March 1989 and from 6 to 10 May 1990. The seminars were organized jointly by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign.

Each seminar was attended by 60 to 80 junior officials and diplomats from Egypt and a large number of African countries. Both seminars consisted of a series of briefings and lectures on disarmament and security matters, followed by extensive discussions. Papers were presented by eminent speakers on topics of general as well as specific interest to the African region. Not all papers could be included here. The discussions that followed the presentations were lively and informal and were not recorded in order to facilitate a frank exchange of views and opinions.

It is hoped that the present publication will contribute to a better understanding and awareness, in the region, of the issues of disarmament and security, and that it will increase knowledge of the international and regional machinery for promoting it. In that sense, the publication would contribute to a broader understanding of disarmament issues in general. To achieve a better informed public opinion is one of the aims of the World Disarmament Campaign, which also seeks to promote wider support for the objectives of the United Nations in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament.

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Opening of the seminar
Opening remarks

Fawzi El-Ibrashi

On behalf of the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I wish to welcome the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the head of our Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi, and all our distinguished guests to the Seminar on African Disarmament and Security. The seminar has been organized by our institute in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

We are pleased that this seminar is taking place at the same time as the people and Government of Egypt are celebrating the return of Taba, over which Egypt has inalienable historical and legal rights. A peace-loving country, Egypt has always worked tirelessly for the creation of a climate of security and stability and for a just and global peace, so that the peoples of the region, including the heroic Palestinian people and all the peoples of Africa, can live in freedom, dignity and security.

Moreover, throughout the last six decades, Egypt's position on international issues, particularly disarmament and global security, has not changed. That position is based on strong principles deriving from Egypt's African, Arab and Islamic identity and from its membership in the movement of non-aligned countries.

These fundamental principles include the non-use of force in international relations, the peaceful settlement of disputes and, above all, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This year, the world witnessed for the first time the actual destruction of a medium-range nuclear missile pursuant to the bilateral agreement concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Fawzi El-Ibrashi is Ambassador and Director of the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt.

We believe that this historic event will lead nations gradually to abandon the notion that security can be guaranteed by armed force.

It was in this favourable international climate that Egypt participated, with a sense of cautious optimism, in the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Our optimism was prompted by the agreement reached between the two super-Powers, for that is an essential pre-condition for any bilateral or multilateral action; our caution stemmed from our belief that we are only at the beginning of a long and arduous road towards the final goal, a road fraught with difficulties.

Since attaining independence, Egypt has attached great importance, at both global and regional levels, to the problem of African disarmament and security. Accordingly, Egypt:

- Is a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting chemical weapons;

- Worked actively for the convening of the Conference on Disarmament, which began work as the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament;

- Worked for the conclusion of conventions negotiated by the predecessor of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Egypt is a party;

- Is a party to the partial test-ban Treaty, concluded at Moscow in 1963;

- Participated actively in the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;

- Adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, 1964);

- Approved the declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East;

- Has intensified current efforts to ensure regional security in the Middle East and studied the regional arms race in this context, more particularly the arms race in weapons of mass destruction;

- Has also intensified efforts for environmental protection in Africa, which was declared a nuclear-weapon-free-zone, and has worked to avert the risk of toxic nuclear wastes.

Each year, Egypt expresses its deep concern about the extension of the arms race to outer space. We know that the results of the bilateral negotiations on this issue between the two super-Powers are not encouraging. The efforts of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament have led nowhere. The international community has yet to achieve its goal of concluding an international convention prohibiting an arms race in outer space.

Africa, too, is facing an increasingly dangerous situation: certain international corporations have attempted to dump toxic nuclear wastes on our continent, even though such wastes come neither from African countries nor from industries or activities involving Africa.

I would now like to give the floor to H. E. Mr. Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who will give the inaugural address.

Inaugural address

Esmat Abdel Meguid

It gives me pleasure to welcome you to this seminar on security and disarmament in Africa, organized by the Institute for Diplomatic Studies and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. I hope the seminar will cast light on the issues of security and disarmament in general and on Africa in particular. I also hope that it will promote to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign and United Nations resolutions on fostering co-operation, security and disarmament at the regional level.

In fact, the close relationship between these three issues of disarmament, development and security is obviously reflected in the policies of African countries, both unilaterally and multilaterally, within the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Since the first OAU ordinary session in 1964, the African heads of State or Government have consistently supported disarmament as an indispensable factor in ensuring security and development in their countries. A result of this stance was the adoption of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Furthermore, several African meetings and conferences have been convened to discuss the issues of disarmament, security and development. For example, an expert-level meeting on these issues was held in Lomé in 1985, pursuant to the approval of the 1984 African summit to hold this Conference, which was organized in collaboration with the United Nations.

Such regional conferences, meetings and seminars, including the present seminar, certainly provide a valuable opportunity to delineate and underline regional interests within the global framework of peace and security. Issues of security, disarmament and development are largely affected by the general state of international relations.

The outlook of the current world situation is characterized by the following:

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1. Increasing military expenditures have exceeded all reasonable levels and entail painful contradictions. While the world spends astronomical sums of money on military purposes, millions of people in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa, suffer from famine, malnutrition and disease. Such a state of affairs constitutes a serious challenge to humanity at large. Constant and regular utilization of human, financial, natural and mineral resources for military purposes has restricted the social, economic and technical options available to the international community, which cannot, given its limited resources, continue to pursue both targets simultaneously: it must choose either armament or development.

2. The endeavour to achieve disarmament should not blind us to present-day realities. It should be recognized that each state, big or small, has vital national and regional security interests. In a world composed of sovereign States, it is unrealistic to deny this fact. In this regard, two factors should be taken into consideration:

(a) The linkage between national, regional and global security issues.

(b) The impossibility of achieving national security through raising the level of armament or through escalating the arms race.

Hence the call for gradual and balanced reductions in armament levels and armed forces, while ensuring the right of each State to undiminished security. At the African level, the achievement of this objective necessitates the elimination of *apartheid* in South Africa, as it constitutes a real threat to peaceful development on the continent.

3. Africa's position on disarmament should be considered from two perspectives: global and regional. Global disarmament is of the utmost importance to Africa, given two facts: Africa is an indivisible part of the global system, and it is the weakest continent in view of its recent independence following a long period of colonial subjugation.

Furthermore, the achievement of disarmament in Africa cannot be speeded up in isolation from what takes place in other regions. The nuclear arms race and the probability of a nuclear disaster as a result pose a general danger to the world, especially to Africa, since such a disaster would devastate all components of its ecological system, there being no means of coping with such an eventuality in Africa. Nuclear disarmament and the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa are extremely important for Africa. On the other hand, Africa's

security is related to global security and to that of other regions. Relations between the two super-Powers, dialogue between NATO and Warsaw Treaty States, the outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and security conditions in the Mediterranean all have repercussions on the issues of African security. For example, it would not have been possible to reach a solution to the problem of Namibia outside the framework of détente between the super-Powers. Also, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would certainly help keep Africa "denuclearized". The North-South dialogue plays a highly important role in the attainment of this objective.

The most important issues of disarmament facing the international community include: the halting of the nuclear-arms race between nuclear States; the launching of nuclear disarmament; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to States not possessing them; the prohibition of an extension of the arms race to outer space, the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons and the prohibition of the development of new types of such weapons, the halting of the conventional arms race; and the launching of disarmament at the regional level.

Egypt's positions *vis-à-vis* disarmament issues are formulated in the light of its principles and interests, as defined by its regional and international status.

As other non-aligned countries, Egypt believes that there is an urgent need for serious and intensive action halting the arms race and make progress in the field of disarmament. This would lead to genuine security for the international community and its member States at reduced levels of armament, since the present level endangers the very survival of mankind, and is contrary to any logical concept of security.

Egypt believes that the highest priority in the field of disarmament is that of nuclear disarmament, in view of the lethal danger to humanity posed by nuclear weapons. This priority was underlined in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (1978), the only comprehensive international document in the field of disarmament adopted by consensus. Egypt urges nuclear States to make progress in halting the nuclear-arms race, to commence nuclear disarmament and to conclude a nuclear-test ban, a measure that would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Egypt therefore

supports and shares in all initiatives and efforts aimed at reaching this objective, including the United States-Soviet Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles and the initiative of some non-aligned States to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive one.

Egypt attaches special importance to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons out of its concern about the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East or Africa. This concern relates to the possibility that Israel or South Africa might acquire nuclear weapons. Because of its keen interest in non-proliferation objectives, Egypt ratified the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, considering it an effective means for ensuring that non-nuclear States would not acquire nuclear weapons. Israel's and South Africa's refusal to adhere to this Treaty and to submit their nuclear installations to international control, thus contravening United Nations resolutions, and the failure of the international community to exercise pressure on either of them to comply with those resolutions represent major shortcomings in the existing non-proliferation system. For the same reason, Egypt supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and has taken initiatives with respect to the establishment of zones in the Middle East and Africa. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones incorporates two important elements: on the one hand, a pledge by all States of a given region not to introduce nuclear weapons into that region and to subject their nuclear installations to control and verification systems and, on the other hand, a pledge by nuclear States not to use nuclear weapons against the States of the region and not to introduce such weapons thereto.

Within the African Group, Egypt plays an important role in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where African States seek to pressure South Africa to accede to the NPT by threatening it with suspension of its membership in the Agency. There are international efforts by the three depositary States of the NPT ratification instruments (United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) to induce South Africa to adhere to the Treaty and to submit its installations to international control. South Africa's procrastination has thus far been obvious.

Egypt supports all efforts to eliminate all other types of weapons of mass destruction, especially biological and chemical weapons. It was among the first to sign the biological weapons

Convention of 1972, and it plays an active role in the Conference on Disarmament in order to accelerate conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Egypt's stance in this regard is part of a consistent position which it and other Arab and non-aligned countries voiced unequivocally at the Paris Conference on chemical weapons, held last January: it is necessary to link progress in the elimination of those types of weapons of mass destruction to parallel progress in the elimination of other types, foremost among which are nuclear weapons. In this way, disarmament measures will ensure the security of all States concerned. This clearly reflects Egypt's desire that the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction be carried out without disrupting the balance in any region or compromising the possibility of maintaining peace therein.

In conclusion, I wish to welcome the representatives and experts of the United Nations. I am confident that their vast experience will enrich discussions during this seminar. I hope that all participants will make optimum use of this important seminar and I wish you every success.

Arms limitation and disarmament in the United Nations: perspectives and prospects

Yasushi Akashi

It gives me great pleasure to address you today at the opening of the Seminar on African Disarmament and Security, which the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs has organized in co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt.

The seminar, which is part of the Egyptian contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign, is the second such event to take place here. The first, a regional conference for the World Disarmament Campaign held in Cairo in February 1985, provided an important occasion for addressing disarmament issues in a regional context.

Egypt's hosting of this second conference attests to its strong support for the United Nations and its keen interest in issues of disarmament and arms limitation. The Seminar will explore in depth important subjects on the disarmament agenda, thus widening the participants' knowledge and understanding of disarmament and security-related issues, particularly in the African context. It is appropriate that the seminar is taking place in Egypt, the cradle of one of the most ancient civilizations in the world. Ever since Herodotus, the ancient Greek historian and traveller, first described Egypt as a "gift of the river", the Land of the Nile has captured the imagination of all who have visited it.

In the next four days, some 100 promising junior diplomats from Egypt and several other African countries will attend an intensive and highly interesting programme of briefings and lectures given by distinguished speakers. This laudable initiative proves once again Egypt's commitment to peace and disarmament. Over the years, Egypt has demonstrated this commitment by its active participation in various

Yasushi Akashi is Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations.

bodies dealing with disarmament, in the course of which it has put forward specific proposals that have attracted the continuing attention of the international community.

The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world has provided the framework in which Egypt has pursued many of its disarmament initiatives. The proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is one example. Egypt has consistently and fervently striven for the establishment of such a zone. The most recent result of these efforts was the adoption by the General Assembly at its forty-third session of a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in this region. Egypt has also ardently supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Mediterranean and Africa.

What is the state of multilateral disarmament today? Most importantly, the climate for consideration of disarmament matters has certainly improved. There is greater willingness to make concessions and achieve mutual understanding. In the last few years, we have witnessed in the First Committee an improved atmosphere, arising particularly from the better relationship between the two major Powers. At the forty-second session, this was reflected in the adoption of fewer resolutions than before. In this past year more resolutions were adopted, but a greater proportion of them were adopted by consensus and successful mergers were achieved among several drafts. The tone of debate itself has changed. It is largely – although not entirely – free of ideological and polemical elements.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission last May adopted, by consensus, guidelines for confidence-building measures and texts on verification (principles, provisions and techniques, and the role of the United Nations in verification). The Commission benefited from greater willingness for mutual accommodation on the part of members as well as from the effective chairmanship of Ambassador Davidson Hepburn of the Bahamas, and from Ambassador Roche's chairmanship of the Working Group on verification.

At the forty-third session, the First Committee recommended a record number of studies to be carried out by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of governmental experts, concerning *(a)* the United Nations role in the field of multilateral verification; *(b)* a comprehensive

update of the 1980 study on nuclear weapons; *(c)* ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms; *(d)* the necessary conditions for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and *(e)* scientific and technological developments, with particular reference to potential military applications and their impact on international security. These five studies will be carried out expeditiously, together with the ongoing study on the Secretary-General's role in the investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons, which we expect to complete by July.

I must point out that these studies are quite different in nature from usual academic or theoretical research. United Nations studies carried out by experts appointed by the Secretary-General, while being thorough and objective, are not untouched by the attitudes and concerns which animate the Governments that nominate experts. They are in a sense pre-negotiation exercises, preparing and surveying the ground for subsequent negotiations by diplomats. The fact that so many new studies were requested by the First Committee last year may well reflect a fluidity of position and a searching mood for new approaches in disarmament on the part of Governments that are not prepared to make precise political commitments at this time.

You might ask why if the general atmosphere at the United Nations in the last couple of years has been so favourable, the third special session on disarmament (SSOD III), held in May-June 1988, failed to adopt a concluding document. My assessment of that session is that it was a useful, if somewhat untimely, exercise, during which many Governments at the most senior level presented views and proposals which were constructive. Indeed, agreement was achieved on most of the paragraphs to be contained in the draft document, but the document as a whole had to be considered as a carefully balanced package and therefore could not be broken up. Since "nothing was agreed until everything was agreed", adoption of the whole document became dependent on a few paragraphs on which major strategic or regional concerns were focused.

In my view, SSOD III showed not only the complexity of harmonizing the divergent security interests of 159 countries, but also the risks inherent in a comprehensive approach to disarmament. I feel that the United Nations Member States are willing to accommodate each other in a practical, *ad hoc*, manner, but in matters of principle,

concept and philosophy, words and nuances acquire a great, perhaps somewhat exaggerated, importance. Consider, for example, the difficulties experienced in the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, which has made little progress since 1965, whereas there has been great progress in peace-keeping and peace-making in actual instances. We can deduce from this that Governments find it easier to co-operate with each other in action than to alter their doctrinal positions.

We may be witnessing the arrival of a new era in the post-1945 world – an era in which pragmatic co-operation among Governments predominates. Lingering suspicions and tensions continue, and military and strategic considerations are still very important, but there seems to be an unprecedented degree of willingness to explore and enlarge areas of common interest and even joint action. I wish to recall here the impressive speech made by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December last year, pointing to a new trend which is gaining momentum – the emergence of a mutually interrelated and integral world. He said that the new phase we are witnessing requires "de-ideologizing" relations among States.

This new era, of which we are seeing the first signs and symptoms, will require careful and co-ordinated efforts by all countries to ensure its consolidation through agreement on concrete matters. It will bring a much greater challenge to the officials and diplomats concerned than the periods when it was enough for them to repeat well-rehearsed lines.

In contrast to their achievements in peace-keeping, multilateral forums have not been able to produce successful treaties or conventions in the past decade in disarmament and arms control. It is true that there *have* been regional agreements, such as Stockholm and Rarotonga, which *are* multilateral, but since the inhumane weapons Convention of 1981, no multilateral treaties or agreements of world-wide application have been agreed upon. We are very hopeful that the chemical weapons convention, which has been under active negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament since the early 1970s, will finally come to fruition within a year or so. But it is a fact that the multilateral negotiations have not in recent years produced anything

comparable to the United States-USSR agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Why has this been the case? Primarily, of course, it has been because multilateral progress cannot be made in an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion, particularly between the major Powers. Although, the past two years or so have seen significant improvements in this respect, there is an inevitable time lag before a new climate at the political level permeates the military and security fields, and before a new climate between the major Powers permeates the rest of the world. Furthermore, tremendous technical and political hurdles have to be crossed before universal agreements involving more than 150 independent States can be reached. But if we believe in the essentially complementary nature of bilateral, regional and global processes in disarmament and their mutually reinforcing effects, it is incumbent on us to accelerate efforts to achieve disarmament agreements on the multilateral side.

Aside from the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable nuclear-test ban and the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, whose fourth review conference will take place next year, are crucial items on our agenda. While I do not blame the major Powers for giving highest priority to their bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, I wish to emphasize the importance of multilateral treaties for greater stability in the world, especially in view of the fact that more and more independent players on the international scene are gaining access to or developing ever more lethal and destructive weapons.

Multilateral activity for disarmament has two aspects: deliberative and negotiating. As to the deliberative aspect, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission have actively contributed to the enunciation of global concerns over the catastrophic effects of nuclear war and more recently over the danger of chemical and conventional weapons as well. Views expressed on these questions have often been well-nigh unanimous. The emerging new approach is based on a search for a universally acceptable consensus, although this requires an infinite amount of patience and may mean that results are not always commensurate with the efforts expended. On the other hand, *negotiations* on a multilateral level have had meagre results in the last decade. This is in stark contrast to the achievements of the 1960s and the

early 1970s. It should compel us to look at the relative weight and emphasis to be given to deliberations and negotiations so that the latter can be encouraged more in the future.

What are the prospects in store for the 1990s? One significant element in the coming decade will obviously be the foreign policy outlook of the Soviet Union under Mr. Gorbachev. Soviet thinking seems to be headed towards a more relativistic view of the diversity of social systems, greater interest in the balancing of national interests and expansion of universal human values.

Throughout the world, there are encouraging signs that improvement in the livelihood of people will be a paramount consideration rather than the enhancement of State authority or adherence to abstract doctrines. In such circumstances, the importance of ideology will continue to decline, and moderation and eclectic approaches will become the order of the day.

The enormous progress in science and technology, with its great benefits as well as horrendous possibilities for application to new weapons, will create fresh opportunities and new dangers. By and large, however, the growing co-operation between Washington and Moscow should provide the background essential for substantial progress in arms control and disarmament. I hope that the dialogue on nuclear disarmament between the two major Powers will be extended in due course to the three other nuclear-weapon Powers.

As a result of greater responsiveness to democratic voices at home, countries are becoming inward-looking, with domestic growth, development and welfare as their top priorities. In this context, if I may hazard a forecast, external military intervention will become less attractive to them. Imposing one's way of life upon others will become increasingly unacceptable. As a consequence, there will be a renewed search for external stability and predictability requiring lower military expenditures in order to enable domestic priorities to be implemented.

On the other hand, the role of players other than Governments on the international scene is bound to grow. Transnational movements of goods and people are already increasing very significantly. Non-governmental and professional organizations and individuals will meet and discuss their common concerns. Transnational corporations are bringing about a world in which not only traditional national boundaries lose much of their meaning, but also the notion of "trade

balance" itself is becoming rather obsolete. Frequent cultural contacts will engender a deeper appreciation of the similarities and differences among peoples and groups. Due to a loosening of cohesion in alliances and a weakening of the grip of national authorities, local, regional, ethnic and religious disputes and conflicts may intensify in the coming decade. But, by and large, international wars and conflicts will be made more difficult to wage, and Governments will be more inclined to turn to multilateral institutions for mediation, arbitration or judicial settlements.

What then will be the agenda for disarmament in the 1990s? First, we are bound to witness the emergence of a new definition of "national security" based on the notion that national security can best be pursued not at the cost of other countries, but only in concert with them. It will be widely recognized that security cannot be assured solely by military means.

Second, whether disarmament will directly contribute to development or not, many countries will realize that an unbridled arms race adversely affects their economic growth and, consequently, national power. At present, in certain Latin American countries 30 per cent of external debt stems from arms purchases. The painful choice has to be made, therefore, between the pursuit of arms and the pursuit of economic welfare. Let us, however, keep in mind that disarmament may not be a pure economic blessing—it could be quite expensive. I am not talking just of the temporary cost of labour dislocation and industrial conversion, but of verification of compliance with agreements. The existing nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) costs $30 million per year; the global verification of chemical weapons may cost ten times as much, although we do not yet know its exact magnitude. I believe that whatever the additional financial cost and sacrifice may turn out to be, disarmament will be infinitely more favourable to the national economic health of all countries, compared to the incalculable cost of the arms race and war.

Third, we should welcome disarmament at whatever level it is carried out: bilateral, regional, subregional or global. Each level will contribute to the others. While global disarmament is extremely complex, due to the multiplicity of players, countries, particularly the major Powers, will have to realize that there is no substitute for it when considering certain kinds of weapons systems.

All encouragement should be given to regional and subregional approaches to disarmament. In this regard, a useful role can be played by the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Latin America and Asia, located respectively in Lomé, Togo; Lima, Peru; and Kathmandu, Nepal. Certain types of co-operation can best be achieved on a regional or subregional basis rather than on a world-wide basis. I never cease to be impressed by the diversity of conditions in various parts of the world. The United Nations should stimulate co-operation wherever it can be achieved, irrespective of the number of countries involved. As Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter envisages, the universal approach has to be reinforced by regional agencies and arrangements for peace.

Fourth, there will be increasing emphasis on openness, transparency and the exchange of information as necessary steps for building mutual confidence, which in turn will facilitate reaching disarmament agreements. The growing trends towards democracy and respect for human rights are also bound to make societies less secretive and more conducive to building mutual trust.

Fifth, disarmament will be achieved much more readily if the system of peaceful settlement of disputes is strengthened by more frequent resort to methods provided for in Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. We should take immense satisfaction in the role played by the Secretary-General and United Nations peace-keeping activities in this regard. As long as nations can resolve their disputes and conflicts by diplomatic or judicial means, they will naturally be less inclined to resort to force of arms.

Sixth, there are not likely to be revolutionary leaps forward in disarmament. Rather, whatever happens will happen in an evolutionary way, step by step. A careful, incremental approach to arms control aiming at balanced and verifiable agreements may, in the end, be more durable than sweeping, over-ambitious schemes.

Seventh, I welcome the increased attention being paid to military doctrines and postures with a view to making sure that they are not aggressive, but defensive in nature. The type and mode of deployment of arms and armed forces are as pertinent as the quantitative aspect of arms. Countries should vigorously pursue the objective of eliminating the capacity for surprise attack and of ensuring that residual arms and armed forces cannot be used for purposes other

than pure defence. I am of course aware that some weapons, e.g. tanks, are defensive to some but offensive to others. I know also that this policy will conflict with the traditional military adage that the best form of defence is offence. I expect, nevertheless, greater willingness on the part of the West to explore the implications of "reasonable sufficiency" proposed by the socialist States.

Eighth, as a mechanism for verifying world-wide agreements relating to certain arms, a system of multilateral verification agreed upon by the parties will have to be installed. While we should not create an institution prematurely, before the substance of the agreement has been decided upon by all concerned, we should be prepared with precise ideas regarding methods and procedures for establishing whatever is necessary to ensure effective verification of global disarmament agreements.

In conclusion, as a more hopeful international situation opens up on the horizon, we must seize all opportunities for disarmament and arms limitation, without dreaming of a millennium. There will, of course, be a substantially greater amount of work to be carried out by all countries. The United Nations is ready to assist in this process with its experience, commitment and above all, its impartial sense of mission. We can be reasonably sure that, if present trends continue, a number of new and important agreements and arrangements will be arrived at in the 1990s, resulting in a tangible improvement in international peace and security. Nations shall be asked to abandon stereotypes and conventional approaches. They shall be asked to be willing at least to test new ideas and novel methods for dealing effectively with a host of problems which accelerating interdependence will impose upon us all.

The Secretary-General has recently said that our changing world is at a "time of extraordinary hope and promise". So it is.

Change and responding to change mean challenge and the courage to make sensible choices. At the same time, we must not be euphoric. Idealism must be tempered with hard-headed realism. But above all, we must demonstrate the vision, the leadership and the tenacity that the opportunity requires and identify practical, forward-looking ways of proceeding, recognizing that security and disarmament demand global, multilateral, regional and bilateral actions in union with each other.

The concept of multilateral disarmament

Olu Adeniji

The historical antecedent of the control of the means of warfare through multilateral action is relatively recent. However, examples of the early attempts show that side by side with the advance in the instruments of war, tentative efforts were made to control the brutality caused by these instruments. The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 was the first significant example. It proclaimed that the only legitimate objective which States should endeavour to accomplish during war was to weaken the military forces of the enemy and that the employment of arms which uselessly aggravated the suffering of disabled men or rendered their death inevitable was contrary to the laws of humanity.

In the spirit of this Declaration, two international conferences were held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907, which contributed to the codification of the laws of war by prohibiting or restricting the use of certain specific weapons. The 1899 Conference prohibited the use "dum dum" bullets which expanded and flattened in the human body, causing more serious wound than other bullets. The 1907 Conference adopted a convention which stated that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy was not unlimited. The Convention prohibited the employment of arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, and in particular it prohibited the use of poison or poisonous weapons. A third Hague Conference, scheduled for 1915, could not be held because of the outbreak of World War I.

After the First World War, multilateral efforts to control armaments continued. The Covenant of the League of Nations, which formed part of the Treaty of Versailles, required the reduction of armaments of all nations "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations". The Council of the League was to formulate plans for such reductions. Significant developments in the period between the two

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world wars included the efforts made to control the size of the navies of the major Powers and the conclusion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in warfare of chemical weapons. Attempts to increase confidence among States resulted in the non-aggression pacts known as the 1925 Locarno Agreements and the 1928 Briand-Kellog pact. By the pact, parties condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and declared that they renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. The pact, signed two years after the commencement of the Preparatory Commission for a World Disarmament Conference, provided impetus for the Conference, which opened in 1932. Attended by representatives of over 60 States and convened under the auspices of the League of Nations, the Conference was convened to discuss the universal reduction and limitation of all types of armaments. Its prime concern was to reach immediate agreement on a treaty for the control of armaments, which would be implemented upon its entry into force. An armaments truce by which Governments would be asked to refrain for a period of one year from any measure involving an increase in their armaments was recommended at the beginning of the Conference. The Conference was in session until early 1936, when it was suspended as a result of Germany's withdrawal from the League.

After the Second World War, multilateral efforts to control armaments resumed under the auspices of the United Nations. Indeed, the Organization was founded as an instrument which would serve as a catalyst in the pursuit of the peaceful coexistence of nations through a system of collective security. An essential element of such a system was the elimination of the necessity for armaments beyond what was required for national defence.

In order to maintain peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Charter of the United Nations, in Article 26, charges the Security Council with the task of formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The role of the General Assembly is more modest. According to Article 11 of the Charter, the General Assembly may consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of

armaments and make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

The discovery of atomic weapons and their use in August 1945 in the closing stages of the Second World War introduced a new element into the considerations underlying disarmament. The mass death and the great destruction caused in Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the atomic bombs dropped on those two cities were very much in the minds of the delegates to the first session of the United Nations. As William Epstein put it, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki changed all the old rules and the United Nations gave first priority to laying down principles of disarmament which had not been spelt out in the Charter".

Patterns of priority

Thus instead of waiting for the plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, envisaged in the Charter, the General Assembly adopted its own pattern of priority. The first resolution, 1 (I), adopted by the Assembly on 24 January, 1946, established the Atomic Energy Commission, which was to urgently make specific proposals for the elimination from national arsenals of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for only peaceful purposes. This partial approach, based on the Assembly's perception of priorities in disarmament negotiations, soon foundered because of the deep distrust that the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies, on the other, had of each other's intentions. Secure in its monopoly of the atomic weapon, the United States proposed, in the Baruch Plan, the creation of an international atomic development authority to which would be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. When an adequate system of control of atomic energy had been agreed upon and put into effective operation, then, according to the United States proposal, "manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop and existing bombs shall be disposed of".

The Soviet Union, conscious of the fact that the Baruch Plan was meant to preserve the United States monopoly of the know-how of atomic weapons, rejected the proposal. In its place, it proposed the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the production

and use of weapons based on atomic energy and the destruction of all atomic weapons within three months of the entry into force of the convention. Violation of the convention was to be considered a serious crime against humanity. In addition to enforcement measures under domestic legislation, other measures to control observance were to be agreed upon.

The two proposals were irreconcilable. In January 1950, after three years of fruitless negotiations in the course of which it successfully tested an atomic bomb, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Atomic Energy Commission.

Side by side with the Atomic Energy Commission, the Security Council established the Commission for Conventional Armaments in February 1947. It was mandated to "submit to the Security Council, within the space of not more than three months, the proposals *(a)* for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and *(b)* for practical and effective safeguards in connection with the general regulation and reduction of armaments".

Like the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission for Conventional Armaments was plagued by a sharp divergence of approach between the West and the Soviet Union. The former laid emphasis on, as a first step, creating conditions for security as well as machinery for checking the level of armed forces and conventional armaments. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, insisted on an immediate practical reduction by members of the Security Council of up to one third of their armed forces. Besides, the Soviet Union insisted that the immediate destruction of atomic weapons was inseparable from the work on conventional weapons. A series of mutually unacceptable proposals based on the opposing positions were either defeated or vetoed in the Security Council. The Soviet Union withdrew from the Commission in April 1950.

Comprehensive approach — the Disarmament Commission

The failure of negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission as well as in the Commission for Conventional Armaments can be attributed in part to the deep distrust between the rival alliances. However, failure can also be attributed to the strict separation of the

forums for negotiations on nuclear and conventional weapons. Once the momentum in General Assembly resolution 1 (I), designed to prevent an arms race in the nuclear field, was lost and once the Soviet Union itself became a nuclear-weapon State, the negotiations on one category of weapons without reference to the other became increasingly difficult. The collapse of the two separate Commissions meant the discontinuance of negotiations at a time when the Korean war was intensifying the cold war. A comprehensive approach to the issue of disarmament, which would encompass the reduction of conventional weapons on the one hand and the issue of nuclear weapons on the other, was considered imperative. Such an approach was adopted by the establishment, in January 1952, of the Disarmament Commission, which consolidated the mandates of the two earlier Commissions. It was mandated "to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty (or treaties) for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only". Thus a comprehensive approach to disarmament was to be tried by the consolidation of negotiations.

However, the Commission soon ran into difficulty because of the continued divergence of views of the United States and its allies (the West), on the one hand, and of the USSR and its allies (the East) on the other. The West placed stress on *disclosure* of military capability and verification to be followed by reduction of conventional weapons and finally the elimination of nuclear weapons. For the USSR, elimination of nuclear weapons had to take place first; besides, it believed that insistence on the divulging of information on military capability was no more than an attempt at organized espionage. These differences persisted to a greater or lesser degree until the Disarmament Commission ceased to function in 1957. The issue of verification thus emerged quite early as a stumbling-block in disarmament negotiations. Its importance has continued to be emphasized.

The cessation of multilateral negotiations in 1957, at a time when rapid advances were taking place in weaponry, created a potentially dangerous situation. In the thinking of those countries concerned about resuming multilateral effort, three new elements were recognized. First was the introduction of the concept of general and

complete disarmament, as a one-step settlement of the armaments problem. Second was the formal recognition of the special responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States, which had further consolidated their positions as the two super-Powers. With this in mind, the two were requested to jointly formulate, for the first time, principles that would govern disarmament negotiations. A third element was the beginning of the democratization of disarmament negotiations by the addition of 8 non-aligned and neutral States to the 10-nation negotiating group, made up of equal number of representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty alliances.

General and complete disarmament

The concept of general and complete disarmament emerged in 1959. It was believed that this approach would overcome all the obstacles hitherto encountered in disarmament negotiations, especially the question of control, and would eliminate any State's gaining military advantage over others. The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 1378 (XIV), expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.

The body of principles developed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the McCloy-Zorin joint statement of September 1961 became the basis for disarmament negotiations for many years. The statement aimed at achieving real disarmament, encompassing as it did a programme for:

(a) The disbanding of armed forces and dismantling of military establishments, including military bases;

(b) The elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) The elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The abolition of organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, the cessation of military training and the closing of all military training institutions;

(e) The discontinuance of military expenditures.

In effect, the statement outlined a programme to ensure "that disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems".

If general and complete disarmament ever had a chance of being accomplished, it was in the three years immediately following the McCloy-Zorin statement of agreed principles when, despite differences in approach, the focus was nevertheless on real measures of disarmament. The period also saw the beginning of the democratization of disarmament negotiations, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) was set up. For the first time 8 representatives of non-aligned and neutral countries were to participate directly in disarmament negotiations, joining the 10 representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. This marked a departure from the belief that disarmament was the concern of only the major military alliances. With the advent of nuclear weapons, war could no longer be confined only to combatant nations; the secondary effect of the use of these weapons could inflict serious damage on other States. Indeed, the mere testing of nuclear weapons was creating serious concern world-wide.

Africa's initiation into the disarmament debate, for example, was in connection with French nuclear testing in the Sahara. African States, fearful of the effect of the fall-out from the tests, called upon France to stop testing in the Sahara. Individual States showed the depth of their concern by breaking diplomatic relations with France. Collectively, African States brought the issue before the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted in 1961 an African-sponsored resolution calling upon Member States to refrain from nuclear testing in Africa. A very significant follow-up step was taken by the first Assembly of the heads of State and Government of the newly created Organization of African Unity (OAU), held here in Cairo in July 1964. The Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Two elements in the Declaration should be stressed in the light of their contribution to the concept of nuclear non-proliferation. First is the concept of making an inhabited region nuclear-weapon-free by a prohibition of the testing, manufacture and storage of nuclear weapons. Second is the undertaking given in the Declaration of African States to conclude under the auspices of the United Nations a treaty not to

manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons. Thus unilateral renunciation of the right to develop nuclear weapons was first undertaken by the African continent. The concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone as a major component of a non-proliferation régime owes a great deal to the African initiative.

The democratization of disarmament negotiations arose also out of the increased membership of non-aligned and neutral States in the United Nations. These countries demanded that their voices be heard in the discussions on international matters. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 saw the beginning of a new centre of influence which was to shift the focus away from the bi-polar world of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. The ENDC was created in recognition of these realities. It was significant that three African countries – Ethiopia, Nigeria and Egypt (United Arab Republic) – were founding members of the expanded Committee. The influence of the non-aligned and neutral States was to be very significant both in the evolution of the concept of disarmament and in the push for disarmament measures. Disarmament negotiations could not ignore areas of tension that attracted an outpouring of conventional weapons by arms manufacturers. Neither could disarmament avoid the linkage between the progressive worsening of the economic plight of the new States and their enormous outlays for the acquisition of arms. To underscore this interrelationship, Disarmament Decades became a feature of United Nations strategy, side by side with Development Decades.

Redefinition of the term disarmament

Up till the McCloy-Zorin joint statement, disarmament had a narrow but tangible connotation. It referred to measures aimed at the reduction of armaments and armed forces as well as the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. After the fruitless efforts of the ENDC in the early years, a redefinition of the concept began to emerge. If no agreement could be reached on concrete measures, at least efforts could be made on related measures aimed at controlling the arms race, especially its nuclear aspect. Collateral measures on which attention was thereafter focused became progressively absorbed into the term "disarmament". In addition, the

reality of the danger of nuclear confrontation, underscored by the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, encouraged the development of crisis management techniques as complementary steps to a disarmament strategy.

Thus in the years following 1962, multilateral disarmament efforts focused on measures such as the partial test-ban Treaty (1963), the outer space Treaty (1967), the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (1968) and the sea-bed Treaty (1971).

Though these measures were not recognized as disarmament measures *per se*, they were to contribute to the modification of the concept of multilateral disarmament.

Henceforth, disarmament encompassed not only actual measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces. It also referred to arms control, a concept related to measures aimed at maintaining strategic stability especially between the super-Powers; to the pre-emption of options of further arms development (non armament); and to confidence-building measures aimed at transparency and avoidance of war by accident, miscalculation and surprise attack. The objection raised to the inclusion of arms control in the general context of disarmament arises from the fact that measures of arms control sometimes involve a quantitative increase or qualitative advance in certain kinds of weapons, rather than reduce armaments. Hence disarmament negotiators, especially those from the third world, avoid the use of the term "arms control" which, in the opinion of the Nobel Peace Laureate Alva Myrdal, often comprises measures "with scant or nil disarmament effect".

The control and management of crises also became an element of disarmament strategy. This arose out of the experience of major crises between the super-Powers. In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Middle East crisis of October 1973, it became clear that a nuclear war could easily break out arising out of situations far removed from the region (Europe) where the arms race was concentrated. As these situations stimulated rather than discouraged the arms race, efforts made to improve communications during crises came to be seen as elements in strategies for avoiding war, especially between the super-Powers.

The concept of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) has also become linked to that of disarmament. A CSBM may

be defined as a bilateral or multilateral undertaking intended to clarify a potential adversary's military intentions, to reduce uncertainties about hostile intent and/or to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack. The most advanced CSBMs have been developed in Europe, in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. They are aimed at preventing the outbreak of war through transparency in military and strategic policies and at preventing of surprise attack on the continent. United Nations studies on CSBMs have shown that they can be adapted to regions other than Europe. Recently the concept of "third-generation" CSBMs has been developed. Such CSBMs aim at: *(a)* restraining the involvement of outside Powers in third-world conflicts; *(b)* inhibiting the spill over of existing conflicts into other regions, for instance Europe; and *(c)* removing those elements in the force structures of the East and West that may tempt the other side to pre-emptive action.

Disarmament-Development

Since the aim of disarmament is the enhancement of security, multilateral disarmament has also broadened to encompass non-military threats to security. According to this thesis, the causes of friction and outbreak of conflicts in the third world are often related to under-development, which is often aggravated by the acquisition of arms, supposedly necessary to enhance security. An element of multilateral disarmament strategy has been the study of the interrelationship of disarmament and development, whereby disarmament can benefit development by releasing resources currently devoted to the arms race. Conversely, the promotion of development through the resolution of non-military threats to security can reduce the necessity for arms acquisition and thus prevent an arms race in the third world, where, it should be emphasized, the practical effect of the arms race has been manifested. Over 150 wars have broken out in the third world since 1945, with the loss of 20 million lives.

Any consideration of the concept of multilateral disarmament cannot be complete without reference to the project of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The unstructured manner in which disarmament negotiations were conducted following failure to agree on a treaty on general and complete disarmament in the early 1960s and the

subsequent concentration on collateral issues created concern. The need to ensure a balance between negotiations on concrete issues of disarmament and collateral measures in a co-ordinated programme was raised in the ENDC. However, it was the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, who first articulated the need for such a programme in the introduction of his annual report for 1969. In proposing that the decade of the 1970s be proclaimed a disarmament decade, the Secretary-General observed:

> "I would accordingly propose that the Members of the United Nations decide to dedicate the decade of the 1970s, which has already been designated as the Second United Nations Development Decade, as a Disarmament Decade. I would hope that the members of the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of arms control and disarmament".

In adopting the Secretary-General's proposal, the General Assembly charged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the name given in 1969 to the expanded ENDC) with the task of working out a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Disagreement within the Conference over the necessity for such a programme and its nature has since hampered its elaboration. The euphoria following the consensus adoption of the Final Document of the first United Nations special session devoted to disarmament in 1978, stimulated hope that agreement on a comprehensive programme was at hand. Indeed the comprehensive programme was considered the main business of the second special session, in 1982. Failure to reach agreement on it, therefore, led to the collapse of that session. Since then interest in the programme has waned considerably, though the Conference on Disarmament continues negotiations on the subject.

In my view, the concept of a comprehensive programme continues to be relevant in the multilateral disarmament strategy. The programme would ensure that negotiations follow a logical, consistent pattern and that progress is discernible even if no rigid time frame is applicable. Bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers, particularly in the nuclear field, constitute a very important element towards nuclear disarmament. However, they should be conducted in accordance with universally agreed guidelines. To make bilateral negotiations dependent on the subjective perceptions of the two parties' intentions and

capabilities, as the super-Powers are wont to do, is to subordinate global interest in the maintenance of international peace and security to national interest. In this connection reference should be made to the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which contains the most compiete articulation of the concept of disarmament. It states, *inter alia*, that:

(a) All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations;

(b) The United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament;

(c) While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

Strengthening political co-operation through multilateral disarmament

Rolf Ekeus

How to strengthen political co-operation through multilateral disarmament: the way in which our organizers have phrased the title to my address to this seminar is thought-provoking.

We are not asked to discuss how to achieve multilateral disarmament through political co-operation; rather, the opposite question has been put to us, namely how to strengthen political co-operation through multilateral disarmament. This approach opens up new vistas and makes it possible to go a little easier on the nitty-gritty of arms control techniques.

The role of the United Nations in relation to arms control and disarmament has not been totally uncontested over the years. The Charter itself is vague on disarmament matters. As a product of its time and of the disaster of the Second World War the emphasis in the Charter is put on collective security as a main tool for preserving peace. Disarmament had fallen into disrepute, after that the Western democracies in Europe had, with tragic effects, unilaterally cut their military forces in the late 1920s and early 1930s—just in time for the existential challenge of nazism, rooted in violence, aggression and war.

Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, multilateral disarmament has enjoyed few successes and experienced many set-backs, in spite of insistent efforts, especially those of the non-aligned and neutral countries. These efforts got symbolic recognition in 1982 when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Alva Myrdal of Sweden and to Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico for their untiring work in the cause of multilateral disarmament.

The consequences of the Second World War in Europe, the division of the defeated Germany and the Soviet political and military

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dominance of Eastern and Central Europe are now coming to an end. This is the result of strong popular pressure, which has coincided with the new direction taken by the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. The policies of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* have put the stress on peaceful economic and social development. In order for such policies to succeed, intellectual, physical and capital resources have to be concentrated on a peaceful build-up and not dispersed for such fundamentally non-productive ends as the maintenance and expansion of superfluous weapons arsenals. An international consensus is emerging that only a policy of détente can open the way to real arms control and disarmament. At the same time, experience has taught us that concrete arms control and disarmament measures support and sustain policies for co-operation and détente between States.

Today the development in Europe is characterized by a move away from a weapons culture towards a new system of co-operation and security. As the security of Europe has been built on the basis of existential threats and deterrence, the rapid developments are away from that primitive way of dealing with international differences and disagreement. It must however be kept in mind that only a few weapons have been scrapped and that important negotiations have not yielded any result so far. The European continent is thus still the most militarized and weaponized in the world, with huge arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons.

In other regions of the world there are situations and developments in which war or the threat of war is a part of the daily experience. There, as elsewhere, we meet the same discussion and the same seemingly endless explanations in favour of armament and rearmament – namely that armament is a consequence of political conflict and not its cause, and that therefore disarmament could take place first and only when the political problems have been solved. This reasoning is close to that of the so-called revolver lobby in the United States: "Guns do not kill people. People kill people." However, my feeling is now that even the most insistent supporter of this gun-philosophy must recognize that in Europe as well as in other regions armaments are indeed part of the problem itself. The economic, as well as the security, situation experienced by the reform countries in Europe bear witness to this. The energy and zeal with which arms control and disarmament are now addressed should be a good enough proof that

disarmament and arms control are recognized means in the joint search for a solution to political problems.

The most important of the multilateral treaties is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968. The aim of this Treaty is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Undertakings to this effect, both by nuclear States and by non-nuclear States, are combined with a system of international safeguards and co-operative arrangements. The responsible agency for safeguards is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. In addition to the responsibilities with regard to safeguards, the task, the major one, of the Agency is to promote international co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The precondition for harmonious functioning of such co-operation is that the NPT be respected and also strengthened.

A similar distinct relationship between arms control arrangements and economic co-operation appears to be emerging in the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Non-aligned and neutral States are proposing the inclusion in the future convention of an article concerning economic and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of chemicals and application of chemistry. In article X of the biological weapons Convention of 1972 there is likewise a paragraph of a similar nature. Unfortunately, its importance has been more of a philosophical than of a practical character.

However, the draft convention on chemical weapons contains something potentially more interesting than the cautious language with regard to economic and technical co-operation. The management of the elaborate and complex control and verification arrangements envisaged for the convention can be feasible only with the establishment of some institutional machinery. For this purpose an international chemical weapons verification agency has to be created. It is in the very nature of the convention that the initial tasks, the monitoring of the destruction of existing weapons stockpiles and the building up of a world-wide control system, would be complex. Thereafter and when the implementation of the chemical weapons convention moves into everyday routine work, it can become a problem to sustain a major international agency to deal with such a (it is hoped) minor task as ascertaining the non-existence of chemical weapons. The future of the verification agency could usefully be assessed in connection with other disarmament and arms control

arrangements. The necessary overhaul of the arrangements concerning verification of compliance with the biological weapons convention could be taken into account, so that eventual over-capacity in an agency set up to deal with chemical weapons could be put to good use.

This brief survey of immediate developments has not touched upon untapped possibilities with regard to broadening multilateral disarmament to cover political co-operation. Let me therefore mention two revolutionary developments in our collective perception in this field. They are, first, the new understanding of verification of arms control and disarmament agreements and, secondly, the evolution of confidence- and security-building measures.

The confidence- and security-building measures should be mentioned first for with them the fundamental concept of confidence has been introduced. The systematic approach to confidence building was developed in the context of the Helsinki process and was first presented in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975. This was a time in international politics when there was hardly any confidence between States and Governments. The confidence- and security-building provisions of the Final Act were of a voluntary character and as such rather ineffective. In the cold war atmosphere of the late 1970s and early 1980s the confidence-building measures, as they were then called, were not talked about much. However, the measures – notification and observation of troop activities in parts of Europe – were faithfully implemented in spite of the fact that they were voluntary. This had the effect that confidence really was built. The 35 CSCE States (including all the European States, except Albania, and two overseas States, the United States and Canada) basing themselves on these promising early experiences, took a major step in Stockholm in 1986 by agreeing on a document containing provisions on confidence- and security-building measures, which are politically binding, verifiable and militarily significant and which encompass the whole of Europe. The implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document has been a complete success, and one which has had many important political consequences.

The provisions for challenge on-site inspection are, from the disarmament point of view, the most important feature of the agreement in Stockholm. This was the first major binding agreement containing the ultimate verification elements, and it was soon to be followed by the

Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles – the INF Treaty – which contained stringent on-site inspection provisions. A quantum leap for verification was thus achieved. New possibilities for multilateral as well as bilateral disarmament were opening up.

For the non-aligned and neutral States which, together with Canada, have struggled over the years to gain respect for verification, including on-site inspection, as a key factor in disarmament work, this is a source of great satisfaction.

The developments during the late 1980s have demonstrated that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between verification and confidence-building. The better the verification, the stronger the confidence, and the more confidence there is, the more open States are to proposals for verification measures.

For the West, the Federal Republic of Germany and its conventional forces are the nucleus of Western security, which the West cannot afford to lose. Therefore, the West is insisting that a united Germany should be linked to NATO. For the Soviet Union a Germany divided into two camps has been a guarantee of stability in Europe. A united Germany with all its military and economic potentials in the Western grouping is upsetting the security situation in the eyes of Moscow. In order to solve this problem in a co-operative manner, all sides are now looking to new arrangements for the creation of stability and satisfactory security to all. The CSCE framework, especially with a system of confidence- and security-building measures, now appears to provide one essential element for a possible settlement. Traditional measures such as notification, observation and inspection of military activities in combination with a new generation of measures involving the exchange of data create transparency with regard to the deployment, structure and posture of military forces. This should dispel concerns for surprise attack or attack with short warning. It now also appears possible to add a long-term component of increased openness with regard to military planning and a measure of constraints with regard to troop movement. All this would, in combination with specific reduction arrangements, constitute a security system which could give satisfaction to all States on the continent and make possible the solution of external problems related to the German question.

Another question that arises is how to approach the problem of the liberation of Eastern Europe from the Soviet military and political domination without upsetting overall stability. The lifting of the constraints of the defence pact arrangements would bring into the open both national concerns and historically complex border problems. In many ways there are important similarities to the situation which came out of the African liberation from colonial domination. The experiences gained by African States could be put to good use in Central and Eastern Europe. It is already clear that the future national and regional problems in Europe will bring a strong demand for co-operative security arrangements. As important tools for creating peace and stability in regions where national differences play a central role in relations between States, arrangements for communication and consultation could be of great importance.

Although the security situation in Europe is unique owing to the special military and geopolitical configuration, the possibility of making use of the experience of European confidence- and security-building measures in other regions of the world should not be overlooked. It is true that many leading third world States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries have looked upon such measures with considerable scepticism. There has been a lingering suspicion over the years that confidence-building measures have been used by the European States and the two major military Powers to justify the absence of tangible arms reductions. Recent developments, including, on the one hand, rapid progress in negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments and of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, various confidence- and security-building measures should help to dispel concerns.

It should come as no surprise that a speaker from Sweden would like to refer to the 1983 report of the Palme Commission, entitled *Common Security*. This report contained the fundamental observation that security could not be obtained through adverse policies but only through mutual understanding between States of their security concerns, and dialogue and co-operation.

It is mainly in one field, that of disarmament negotiations and implementation of disarmament agreement, that States which do not belong to any alliance or to the same alliance enter into an in-depth systematic discussion with each other on such questions as security and

military matters. Within the disarmament area, it is verification that is the central element. Verification is now recognized by all as the foremost, and an indispensable, tool for disarmament and arms control. Verification provides the openness and transparency in military matters that dispel unfounded concerns. Implementation of verification provisions requires systems for communication and consultation. Experiences gained so far from implementation of the two existing inspection systems, that of the Stockholm Document and that of the INF Treaty, tell us that these operations are not only carried out in a good atmosphere but that the inspections have become more or less co-operative undertakings.

For the United Nations the development of the peace-keeping operations has been one of its proudest achievements. Its peace-keeping is one of the best tools the Organization can use in fulfilling its responsibilities for promoting international peace and security.

We all know how complex and sensitive the situation can be in areas plagued by tension and conflict. The United Nations, in its peace-building efforts, could look more closely into the newly won experiences in the field of verification and confidence- and security-building measures. As demonstrated with the implementation of the INF Treaty and of the Stockholm Document, verification in the broader sense of the concept – meaning transparency, confidence-building and co-operation – could, in combination with the traditional United Nations roles of peace-keeping, observation, mediation and providing good offices, become an effective addition to the possibilities of the world Organization. Any major peace-building effort could be strengthened and sustained by a carefully calibrated mix of verifiable arms reductions, stabilizing and confidence-building measures, increased transparency, combined with the peace-keeping offices and operations.

Through the interaction between various approaches the United Nations would be well suited to co-ordinate operations and to harmonize them with political steps and mediation efforts.

It is clear that institution-building related to global as well as regional disarmament-related treaties and agreements will be more important as time goes on. This creates capacities and opportunities which should not be lost in a broader political context. The co-operative character of verification has interesting and promising political

dimensions also, which could be put to good use. An unavoidable complication is, however, the treaty-specificity of most verification arrangements.

The close to universal membership of the United Nations should be a decisive factor in making this Organization the focal point as we now begin to address the task of defining and exploring the possibilities of creating new structures for international political co-operation. This seminar here in Cairo is one of the first steps in this endeavour.

Disarmament, development and security: a United Nations perspective

Abdelkader Bensmail

The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations expresses the determination "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". Furthermore, it declares the intention "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples". The Charter also refers to "the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources" and to the promotion of "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development" with a view to "the creation of conditions of stability and well-being".

Thus, from the inception of the United Nations, there has been recognition of disarmament and development as two vital issues before the international community. In its efforts to achieve these two separate goals, the world Organization has also progressively become involved with the relationship between them. This involvement has grown along with an increasing recognition that a curtailment in the military consumption of resources could be a factor in the resolution of pressing international problems, whether these pertain to matters of peace and security, to international economic co-operation or to a wide range of other social and economic issues.

Disarmament and development remain, indeed, parallel and distinct processes, although there are many ways in which they can reinforce each other. Both in turn are widely held to be linked with security. Thus, it is recognized that a triangular interaction exists

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between disarmament, development and security. As stated in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible".

Continuing arms buildups are pertinent not only in the context of disarmament, but also in that of development. Beyond the simple opportunity-cost effect, the process of arms accumulation could make development more difficult in several respects. It is generally felt that unless the world proceeds more resolutely towards the ultimate aim of disarmament, it will not, in the long run, be able to achieve or sustain development fully and world-wide.

Development is an objective of both developed and developing countries. Developed countries need to sustain or improve their economic performance; developing countries need to attain better economic performance.

At the 1978 special session, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, a comprehensive study of the relationship between disarmament and development. It took three years for a group of 27 experts, under the leadership of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, to prepare the study, which was presented to the General Assembly in 1981.

In 1984, following a proposal by President Francois Mitterrand of France the previous year, the General Assembly decided to hold an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, which would deal with the following three items:

1. Consideration of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.

2. Consideration of the implications of the level and magnitude of continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.

3. Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.

The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the ground for which was laid during four sessions of its Preparatory Committee, was held at a high political level in New York in 1987.

After this brief historical presentation of the issue in the General Assembly and before outlining the main results of the Conference, I should like to dwell a little on the conceptual approach to the relationship between disarmament, development and security.

The world community has traditionally referred to security in terms of balance of power and military strength and capabilities; disarmament, which is, of course, closely linked to the whole concept of security, has usually been considered in the same framework. As a result, overarmament has prevailed in the world. This overarmament is on a large scale in the conventional field, and dramatically striking in the nuclear field. It is estimated that there are now on our planet some 50,000 warheads or the equivalent of more than one million Hiroshima bombs, which would be sufficient to destroy all life on Earth several times over. The practical result is that the world is now spending $1 trillion per year for building up and maintaining defences in the conventional, chemical and nuclear fields. About one fourth of all research and development in the world is applied to the military sector.

While most of the armaments are concentrated in the two major Powers and some other industrialized countries, most arms imports are accounted for by developing countries, which, most of the time, can ill afford them.

While about one billion of the five billion human beings on Earth live in conditions of plenty, or even opulence and over-consumption, one billion of the four remaining billion live in dire poverty and at a level below human dignity. It is estimated that some 800 million are undernourished, some 850 million are illiterate, some 1.5 billion are without access to medical facilities, and an equally large number are unemployed. Moreover, the per capita income in the richest countries is more than a hundred times higher than in the poorest ones, and official development assistance (ODA) has been stagnating or even

diminishing in real terms at around $35 billion to $40 billion per year, which represents some 4 per cent of the amount spent on armaments.

Furthermore, as was made abundantly clear by the Brundtland Commission on Environment and Development, desertification, deforestation and soil erosion are continuing at an alarming pace, and major causes of environmental degradation world-wide are mass poverty and extravagant life-styles in the developed world.

The disproportion between the world's spending on preparations for war, on the one hand, and the rather insignificant contributions to help improve the lot of the disinherited, on the other, is a most glaring anomaly and a sad reflection of the priorities of humanity.

This is the background against which the International Conference took place. It was the first United Nations conference ever to focus specifically on the relationship between disarmament and development, and as such it was unique.

The relationship between disarmament and development is not accepted by all Governments. The United States Government, for example, maintains that disarmament and development are important processes in their own right, that there is no link between them, and that they should be treated separately. Therefore the United States did not participate in the Conference. Obviously, there is no automatic, causal link between disarmament and development, and it might well happen that dividends from disarmament would not go into development, but rather into further wasteful consumption. But, whatever the link between disarmament and development – direct or non-direct – nobody can deny that in a world of finite resources there is competition for resources and that these resources can be released from one area and channelled into another. Disarmament and development are therefore linked, and it was General Eisenhower who puts this linkage into sharp focus when he said:

> "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in a final sense, a theft from those who hunger, who are not fed and from those who are cold and are not clothed."

The outcome of the Conference was a Final Document adopted by consensus by the 150 countries that participated from all parts of the world. In this Document, it was agreed that "disarmament and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace

and security can be built". It was also stressed that "the continuing arms race is absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources" and that there is "a commonality of interests in seeking security at lower levels of armaments and finding ways of reducing these expenditures". The participating States, furthermore, recognized that "the contrast between the global military expenditures and the unmet socio-economic needs provides a compelling moral appeal for relating disarmament to development", and that there is "a growing recognition that both overarmament and underdevelopment constitute threats to international peace and security". I am sure that everyone would agree that these are important consensus statements. One of the main achievements of this Conference was to focus on what are called "non-military threats to security", in the following words:

> "Underdevelopment and declining prospects for development, as well as mismanagement and waste of resources, constitute challenges to security. The degradation of the environment presents a threat to sustainable development. The world can hardly be regarded as secure so long as there is polarization of wealth and poverty at the national and international levels. Gross and systematic violations of human rights retard genuine socio-economic development and create tensions which contribute to instability. Mass poverty, illiteracy, disease, squalor and malnutrition afflicting a large proportion of the world's population often become the cause of social strain, tension and strife."

Thus, security is not only a question of arms. Security is not only an East-West issue; it is also a North-South one because of a growing interdependence among nations and the interrelationship of global issues. The Conference took a comprehensive approach to security, when it stated:

> "The world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigour or move consciously and with deliberate speed towards a more stable and balanced social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order; it cannot do both."

Although it was recognized in the Final Document that disarmament and development are distinct processes and that each should be pursued vigorously regardless of the pace of the other, it is

also stated that disarmament and development have a close and multi-dimensional relationship. This relationship derives in part from the fact that the continuing global arms race and development compete for the same resources at both the national and international levels. The allocation of massive resources for armaments impedes the pursuit of development to its optimal level. Conversely, the development process, by overcoming non-military threats to security, can enhance security and thereby promote arms reductions and disarmament.

I have tried to give you an overview of the affirmations of principle to which 150 countries were able to subscribe in the Final Document. These affirmations form a basis on which one can build and from which, hopefully, one can draw practical conclusions in the future.

However, the Conference did not only result in agreement on statements of a general nature. It also tried to transform some of the agreements in principle into practical action in the programme of action that it adopted. Many would have liked this programme of action to be stronger and more concrete, but it represented the only level of commitment which, at that stage, it was possible to achieve.

I should like to mention, as an important point in this context, the fact that participating States reaffirmed "the international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament for purposes of socio-economic development, with a view to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries". Many, in particular developing countries, wanted to see this commitment in principle followed up by some kind of financial instrument, a disarmament for development fund, as a tangible manifestation of the disarmament-development relationship.

The idea of an international disarmament fund for development is not a new one. As early as 1955, France had proposed such a fund at the United Nations,and recently the proposal had been reiterated by both Governments and independent expert commissions. However, it could not command consensus. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that what is most important is the will to disarm and to release resources from armaments to development. A commitment in principle to that effect has been taken, the States participating in the Conference agreed to give consideration "to the utilization of existing regional and international institutions for the reallocation of resources

released through disarmament measures for socio-economic development, particularly in developing countries".

Other important elements in the programme of action are recognition of the importance of greater openness among nations and of the provision of objective information on military budgets, and consideration of keeping under review issues relating to the conversion of military industry to civilian production and of according priority to the allocation of part of the resources devoted to military purposes for emergency humanitarian relief operations.

Not least is the fact that the United Nations was given the task of following up the disarmament-development perspective in the framework of its activities and of promoting collective knowledge of the non-military threats to international security.

The Conference marked the beginning of a process and provided for a follow-up and review mechanism at the regular sessions of the General Assembly, with the aim of maintaining and, if possible, strengthening the consensus already arrived at.

One of the main results of the Conference was to affirm the triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security; it firmly placed the disarmament-development perspective on the international agenda. A process was started and follow-up action was agreed upon. A commitment in principle to release resources from armaments to development was made, and the Conference clearly sent the message that peace and security are not threatened by military factors alone, but by non-military ones as well. What can be called an extended, comprehensive concept of security was articulated. More importantly, this Conference was a victory for the United Nations, for multilateralism and for international co-operation in general. The world was able to see that it is possible, within the United Nations, to work out and express commonly shared views with regard to disarmament, development and security, to our interdependence, and to our interest in peace.

But for any victory to be lasting, it must be consolidated and followed up. Security is clearly not only a question of arms; disarmament, development and security can, in an interrelated perspective, constitute a triad of peace.

I think I have now covered most of the important points relevant to the relationship between disarmament and development –

what the Conference was all about, what it achieved, and what it did not achieve.

As a final word, I should like to leave with you the concluding paragraph of the Declaration of the Panel of Eminent Personalities which was convened by the Secretary-General of the Conference as part of its preparatory process:

> "Our small planet is getting endangered: by the arsenals of weapons which could blow it up; by the burden of military expenditures which could sink it under; and by the unmet basic needs of two-thirds of its population which subsists on less than one-third of its resources. We belong to a near universal constituency which believes that we are borrowing this Earth from our children as much as we have inherited it from our forefathers. The carrying capacity of Earth is not infinite, nor are its resources. The needs of national security are legitimate and must be met. But must we stand by as helpless witnesses of a drift towards greater insecurity at higher cost?"

Priorities, positions and role of African States in disarmament and security issues in multilateral forums

Abdel Halim Badawi

In the aftermath of the Second World War, which witnessed massive bloodshed, destruction, and devastation of unprecedented dimensions, the world community recognized that a global and common vision of security was imperative if the nations of the world were to live in real peace and prosperity. Against this ominous background, the United Nations was conceived and its Charter adopted as the corner-stone of a new international system. This Charter has often been criticized of late – with the luxury of hindsight – but it remains a manifesto which cannot be equalled today, and it incorporates the basic tenets that have regulated international relations for the past four decades and that will remain valid for many years to come. In the Preamble of the Charter, bearing in mind the painful events of the years preceding its adoption and determined to prevent their recurrence, the nations of the world declared their determination to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security. Article I defines the purposes of the United Nations, one of which is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace". The large majority of States independent at that time and those that gained their independence since subsequently affirmed their commitment to the Charter.

Gradually, however, some States or groups of States felt compelled to search for further measures to ensure their security, while reaffirming their continuing and unwavering commitment to the Charter. Some chose to enter into regional arrangements with States having similar beliefs or compatible political and social systems. Several of these arrangements encompassed military as well as political

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dimensions. For some States, these arrangements provided an opportunity to legitimize and politically formalize the role and position they had envisaged for themselves in the new world order. Along these lines a series of regional bodies emerged, the most prominent being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), encompassing Western European and North American States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), encompassing Eastern European States. A few States entered into informal arrangements with these major alliances.

At the other end of the political spectrum remained the majority of the world, unwavering in its belief that such pacts or alliances did not provide real security. Sweden and Switzerland among others considered their security best ensured by insulating themselves politically and declaring their neutrality formally. Another large group, the non-aligned States, perceived that their security lay in remaining outside any military alliance and, as far as possible, equidistant from both, while promoting peaceful co-existence. The Bandung Afro-Asian summit Conference, the kernel of the Non-Aligned Movement, proposed a new world order on the basis of principles emphasizing the rejection of alliances with military blocs and stressing the need for peaceful co-existence. The newly born Non-Aligned Movement held its first summit in Belgrade in September 1961. The summit again reaffirmed the Movement's strong opposition to alliances with military blocs, and went on to argue that their establishment provoked periodic aggravation of international relations. The Movement envisaged the attainment of security through peaceful co-existence and underlined the need to avoid a nuclear disaster.

It is worth noting that the Non-Aligned Movement has been able, by and large over the years, to preserve a great deal of coherence in its basic tenets regarding security and disarmament. To its credit and as an indication that it has been able to measure accurately the pulse and concerns of the majority of the world community regarding security and disarmament issues, it has become the practice that non-aligned consultations at the different multilateral forums – whether in New York or Geneva – include States such as Brazil and Mexico, which are not formal members of the Movement. That is not to say that different regions of the world that fall under the non-aligned umbrella do not have their own national and regional security concerns; in fact, there are a number of regional initiatives in Latin America and Africa. These

concerns, however, and the initiatives aimed at addressing them have not been mutually exclusive and are not in conflict with each other when put in the multilateral context of security and disarmament.

Over the years the concept of security has undergone gradual but important development. Traditionally, security or threats to security were perceived solely in their military dimensions and in relation to the security or sovereignty of national borders and frontiers or the security and safety of populations. Developments in technology and their impact on the arms race and on peaceful co-operation between States have made the different regions of the world much more interrelated and interdependent. The armed forces of the two major blocs are deployed on the seas and oceans throughout the world. Any major regional conflict as well as any conflict between the two major blocs would have devastating effects on many parties not directly involved. Can we believe, for instance, that the sea lanes along the northern coast of Africa, the crossroads of the five continents, would remain safe if an armed conflict were to break out in that region? Would this not put dire restrictions on and set up obstacles to world trade in commodities? Can we believe that the security of the Mediterranean and Europe can be guaranteed independently? Why is it that several major Powers and their allies have expressed strong reservations regarding the proposal to declare the South Atlantic, from Latin America to Western Africa, a zone of peace and co-operation, if not to safeguard their own perceived security interests and concerns? Does this not bring super-Power rivalry to the Western coast of Africa? Technological developments have also brought to international attention many of the global problems that in one way or another, affect the security of the world as a whole. Deforestation, desertification, depletion of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect and other environmental concerns are only a few examples of such problems. One must conclude that one's security in the present day has numerous dimensions, only a few of which are generated from within one's own region, and that all include numerous elements that are not military in nature.

Africa's positions regarding security issues in the multilateral context emanate first of all from the commitment of the African States to the Charter of the United Nations, and the basic principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. Africa has also taken a further step in defining its security concerns and priorities through the establishment of its

regional organization, the OAU. The members of OAU, inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among their peoples and co-operation among African States in response to the aspirations of their peoples for brotherhood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences, declared in the Statute of OAU that they would translate their "determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress", and that to that end "conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained".

Africans can be proud that they have long recognized that security has both non-military and military dimensions. The OAU summit in 1984 adopted resolutions AHG/Res.126(XX) and AHG/Res.138(XXI), calling for the convening of an African expert meeting on security, disarmament and development. The meeting held in Lomé, Togo, issued an historic proclamation in the African context. It adopted The Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa, the salient points of which can be summarized as follows:

1. There is a close interrelationship and interdependence between the objectives of security, disarmament and development, not only in Africa but world-wide;

2. Peace and security are the highest priority objectives of independent African States and the foundation for socio-economic development;

3. The purpose of a progressive reduction of arms must be to enhance peace and security through the minimum level of armaments and armed forces;

4. The concept of security in the region must go beyond military security and the prevention of armed conflicts to encompass a sustained commitment by States of the region to African, national, bilateral and multilateral programmes of socio-economic development, justice, equity and human dignity;

5. The objective of disarmament efforts in the region should take into account existing realities in other regions and avoid placing Africa in a real or perceived permanent security disadvantage. There should be a collaborative effort that eliminates inter-State arms competition in the region, fosters the peaceful settlement of disputes

and enhances a united approach in dealing with threats to the region's peace and security.

Thus one can easily see that security concerns of African States today are defined by a number of parameters, the most prominent of which are: *(a)* the collective security system embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; *(b)* the tenets of the Non-Aligned Movement; *(c)* the statute of OAU; *(d)* the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa.

The preservation of security has been a legitimate driving force behind State's acquisition of arms. Unfortunately it has also often been used as an excuse for arms acquisitions that have, thereafter, been directed towards expansionist endeavours. States have also had the tendency to overarm, often because of mistaken perceptions of threats to their security. The advent of atomic bombs and their use against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with their tremendously destructive capacities, shocked the world into recognizing the inherent dangers of "overkill capacity or excessive armament". Such arms as they were now being produced had an inherent danger and could no longer be considered neutral. The United Nations quickly focused on this reality and its first resolution, adopted by the General Assembly on 24 January 1946, created the Atomic Energy Commission, which was urgently to make specific proposals for, *inter alia*, the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

In the light of this reality the disarmament movement in the world community gained momentum. Without dwelling in detail on its development, it is worth noting that at its 1959 session the General Assembly adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), in which "general and complete disarmament under effective international control" was stated to be the goal of disarmament measures. Another historic achievement by the world community was the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in the summer of 1978, which set forth a series of priorities agreed upon by the world community: "nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurous or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces". An equally important achievement of that special session was the adoption of a programme of action encompassing a series of concrete steps and

measures. Unfortunately commitments undertaken in 1978 have not been followed through with the same sense of urgency and determination. Two further special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have but meagre results. However, the 1978 Final Document remains valid, and its influence on world public opinion and, thus, on the disarmament policies of the nations of the world, particularly of the two super-Powers and the major military alliances, should not be underestimated.

I would now like to dwell for a few minutes on the positions taken by African States with respect to different disarmament issues. I shall do so without entering into a detailed explanation of them since they will be dealt with by other speakers.

In Cairo more than a quarter of a century ago, the African States met for their first summit conference and brought to the world's attention the threat posed to all of Africa by the *apartheid* régime of South Africa and its developing nuclear capability. That very first summit underscored the priority that Africa has accorded to the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and its wholehearted commitment to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. The African leaders did not stop with eloquent words and declarations, but joined together in making a formal commitment to renounce the nuclear weapons option. They adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, whereby they called on all States not to test, manufacture, or store nuclear weapons in the African continent. The summit also declared its readiness to undertake, in an international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, the obligations not to acquire such weapons. Nuclear proliferation has been and continues to be the primary direct security threat that faces the African community and that is being dealt with in the multilateral context.

It is important to emphasize that while African States through the 1964 Declaration have politically renounced the nuclear weapons option, they continue to believe that the primary threat to their security emanates from the nuclear threat, in particular, the nuclear capability of South Africa. The ominous reality that Africa remains threatened by nuclear weapons even though it has renounced them is immoral.

Just for the sake of argument, if one were to leave aside the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability, one might be tempted to ask

whether Africa would still accord nuclear issues such prominence in its list of priorities? The OAU meetings have often warned of the threat posed to African States by the nuclear capability of Israel. Other situations may emerge in the future as well. One must caution against ruling out the emergence of new political alignments which may bring the nuclear threat to the African continent from yet another direction. However, let us leave all this aside and consider only the potential effects of a nuclear conflict between the major military alliances, a conflict that would occur in a totally different region. What effects would this have on Africa? The answer to this question can be drawn from the conclusions of the United Nations study on the climatic and other global effects of nuclear war which had the following to say:

> "The scientific evidence is now conclusive that a major nuclear war would entail the high risk of a global environmental disruption." ...
>
> "Beyond one month, agricultural production and the survival of natural ecosystems would be threatened by a considerable reduction in sunlight, temperature depressions of several degrees below normal and suppression of precipitation and summer monsoons."
>
> "The sensitivity of agricultural systems and natural ecosystems to variations in temperature, precipitation and light leads to the conclusion that the widespread impact of a nuclear exchange on climate would constitute a severe threat to world food production. The prospect of widespread starvation as a consequence of a nuclear war would confront both targeted and non-targeted nations. ...The direct effects of a major nuclear exchange could kill hundreds of millions: the indirect effects could kill billions."
>
> "The socio-economic consequences in a world intimately interconnected economically, socially and environmentally would be grave. The functions of production, distribution and consumption in existing socio-economic systems would be completely disrupted."

In view of these conclusions, one cannot be surprised to see African States at the forefront of the world community in calling for the cessation of a nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. They have wholeheartedly supported the early conclusions of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and have called for a prohibition on any such tests in all environments for all time. Some African States have supported a recent

initiative to amend the partial test-ban Treaty in order to transform it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The upcoming Fourth Review Conference of the NPT will provide an auspicious opportunity for Africa and the rest of the world to address all these issues.

At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body, with a membership of 40 States, seven African States are represented. They are, in alphabetical order: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Zaire. These States have been extremely active in conveying the African point of view during the disarmament negotiations. Their constructive contributions, whether through statements or proposals, have been quite important. For example, Nigeria, has submitted proposals to the Conference aimed at according security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Africa was also the first to add the regional dimension to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. In response to the French nuclear test in the Sahara in 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations during its 1961 session adopted a resolution, co-sponsored by 14 African countries, prohibiting any nuclear tests in Africa.

The African attitude to nuclear disarmament issues can thus best be described as two-dimensional. It addresses first, the global concern and, secondly, a more direct regional concern. The priority accorded to the nuclear issue by Africa is fully consistent with the priority given to it by the Non-Aligned Movement and endorsed by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Other weapons and disarmament issues have also been the subject of African concern and African initiatives: weapons of mass destruction such as chemical or radiological weapons, weapons that have indiscriminate effects, or the reduction of military budgets, and disarmament and development. Egypt has been among the most active African States in the chemical weapons negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, but it is also relevant to note that the recently convened Paris Conference on the Geneva Protocol of 1925 was attended by 24 African Foreign Ministers, a clear indication of the continent's strong support for chemical weapons disarmament.

A draft treaty prohibiting radiological weapons was first brought to the Conference on Disarmament in 1979 through the joint

initiative of the super-Powers. Negotiations on this subject were immediately widened in scope through a proposal submitted by Sweden and supported by different non-aligned countries to the effect that attacks on nuclear facilities should be prohibited as well as radiological weapons because of their possible radioactive effects. In 1988, in view of reports that some dumping of radioactive or hazardous wastes in Africa was being envisaged or had occurred, the OAU's Ministerial Conference adopted resolution CM/Res.153(XLVIII) to bring this new threat to Africa to the United Nations General Assembly during its session later that year. At that session two resolutions initiated by African States requested the Conference on Disarmament to address the issue. Pursuant to one of the resolutions, the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session will be provided with a report by the Secretary-General indicating what measures have been undertaken to prevent any such acts in the future.

African States, with the exception of the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, which has not yet renounced nuclear weapons, endeavoured to acquire conventional arms when they perceived that their security was threatened. Since perceptions are never clearly defined, this has led in some circumstances to overarmament and the emergence of conventional arms races in some regions of Africa. The Lomé Declaration addressed the issue of overarmament and the importance of directing the world's finite resources to social and economic development because of several concerns, the most prominent being conventional overarmament in Africa – a state that glaringly contrasts with the continent's abject poverty.

The arms component of Africa's military expenditure has been directed exclusively towards the acquisition of conventional weapons. Over the past few years, a general consensus has evolved within the international community that the conventional weapons dimension of the arms race has reached ominous proportions. Without prejudice to the priority given nuclear disarmament, the commitment to undertake conventional disarmament measures has solidified. When the issue of conventional weapons has been considered in the different multilateral disarmament forums, Africa's position has reflected a keen interest in seeing the world community address this problem in the appropriate manner. The position paper prepared by the African States for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the

summer of 1988, called upon the General Assembly to encourage States to commit themselves to accelerate and conclude negotiations on conventional arms limitation and reduction.

Africa is a continent of developing countries, the majority of which have dire development needs and do not have the resources to address them. It was quite logical therefore to see African activism and keen interest in generating a common understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development. As can be recalled from the preamble of the Lomé Declaration, the relationship between disarmament, peace and security is clearly focused in the minds of all Africans. Africa has consistently cried out for a more equitable and humane distribution of the world's finite resources. It is the firm belief of Africans that it is not morally or politically acceptable that military expenditures are close to $1 trillion while hundreds of thousands of human beings die of hunger and deprivation. Figures are scarce regarding the military expenditure of African States, and when they are available they are often quite unreliable. According to the 1988 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in 1986 the portion of GDP directed to military expenditure in African States ranged from 1 per cent to 7 per cent. This is lower than the percentage in most of the regions of the world. However, given Africa's acute development problems, even this percentage is an extravagance that African States cannot afford, yet are in many cases forced to sustain. For example, the front-line States of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe spend 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the government budget on military expenditures because of the abhorrent and aggressive policies of South Africa.

In the Lomé Declaration, African States made a clear commitment to address this issue. They actively pursued the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, held in New York in August 1987. Prior to the Conference, the twenty-third summit Conference of OAU endorsed a resolution which incorporated an African position paper on issues to be addressed by the Conference. In that paper, Africa emphasized that security was central to the concerns of all. It was therefore necessary that the military and non-military threats to national and international security be duly taken into account. It underlined that the continuing arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, exacerbated

political tension in the world and diverted human and economic resources that were indispensable for socio-economic development, in particular in Southern Africa. The quest for security through armament had resulted in the distraction of attention from essential priorities for the improvement of human well-being. It was high time to pay the greatest attention to the numerous non-military threats to security.

I have touched on but a few of the numerous disarmament issues before the world community in the multilateral forums. These were chosen with an eye to the issues to which the world community has accorded priority and, with an eye to the issues of direct concern to Africa. I have attempted to convey to you the importance each of these issues has for the African continent, as well as the position commonly shared by African countries towards them.

Recognizing that disarmament would provide invaluable impetus to its efforts to meet its security concerns, Africa has been extremely active in the different multilateral disarmament forums over the years. Many African States have played a prominent role in the development of concrete disarmament proposals and treaties. Egypt had the honour of presiding over the First Committee at the United Nations when the NPT was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1968, as well as over the Third Review Conference of that Treaty, in 1985. Egypt has also provided a number of technical experts on disarmament issues such as chemical weapons and environmental effects of a nuclear war, who have participated in expert group meetings. Many other African States have also provided prominent statesmen who have contributed to the disarmament process. Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria, whom you listened to yesterday, was the president of the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and masterfully brought that Conference to a successful conclusion. Africa should be proud of its contributions to the multilateral disarmament process.

Africa must pursue its activism in the years to come at a faster pace and with greater determination. As a non-nuclear, non-aligned developing continent which, apart from some areas of conflict, is comparatively less armed than the rest of the world, its voice has moral authority. Several African States with relatively developed civilian industries have participated in technical aspects of the disarmament

debate. Their numbers will grow as civilian industries develop, since they are basically quite similar to military industries. On many issues Africa's contribution has been, and may continue to be of a political and legal nature, but this is also invaluable, for disarmament decisions – after all the technical debates subside – are political decisions.

Our role is to sustain negotiations, particularly multilateral negotiations. We must preserve our priorities and highlight our concerns. We must put the disarmament process back on course towards attaining security at the lowest level of armament.

I would like to conclude with a general comment – one I feel compelled to make. We have witnessed in recent years a growing tendency to deal with disarmament issues in a bilateral context, at the expense of multilateral disarmament effort. Africa, on the other hand, along with many non-aligned countries, has consistently and vehemently reaffirmed its strong conviction in the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Africa and all member States of the United Nations should undertake to facilitate the effective jurisdiction of the Organization in this field and to implement concrete guidelines and measures to strengthen its institutional role and capacity, bearing in mind that the Charter envisages that multilateral disarmament agreements will play an important role in maintaining international peace and security. Such a development will expedite the full and faithful implementation of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, especially the collective security provisions embodied therein.

Security concerns in the African region and intraregional arrangements

Mamadou Bah

We have met here in Cairo in order to discuss issues of great importance, including the very sensitive issues of security in Africa and intraregional arrangements.

In order to discuss security concerns, we must examine the factors responsible for insecurity – shared insecurity, moreover.

Prior to 1963, the factors responsible for insecurity were seen in the light of the conflict-laden relationship between the colonial Powers and the colonies of the time. The mother countries opposed the emancipation of the African peoples for a long time.

Today, these factors are seen in the light of interrelated social, economic, ideological and political mechanisms, indirect confrontation between the super-Powers, of social and political instability and of various kinds of ethnic and regional rivalry Insecurity interferes with the operation of State machinery and can have an extremely traumatic effect on an entire nation and, as a result, on an entire region.

All these factors were recognized by OAU at the time of the discussion of the proposal put forward by the Government of Sierra Leone concerning the establishment of an OAU political security council. The aim was to determine the nature of the conflicts experienced by the States members of OAU, and three fundamental aspects of regional security concerns were identified.

The first aspect is of a purely colonial, tyrannical and fascist nature, namely, the continuing existence of the minority racist régime in South Africa, together with the illegal occupation of Namibia. The fundamental outcome of this situation has been:

- Oppression of the black majority in South Africa and the escalation of violence, both of which are likely to produce a social conflagration and a blood-bath;

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- Aggression and the destabilization of neighbouring States, resulting in the destruction of economic infrastructure, which in turn leads to a whole series of social misfortunes;

- Streams of refugees and displaced persons.

The second factor is of a bilateral nature and concerns ideological, ethnic or other types of rivalry between States, which often engender conflicts in the form of border disputes. The consequences of such conflicts are extremely distressing. Naturally, this is not an appropriate time to list or analyze the conflicts in question. We wish simply to draw attention to their regional nature. The consequences of a conflict, even if it is between only two States, are never confined to the two States in question. They inevitably affect neighbouring States and are more far-reaching than one might imagine.

The third factor is of an internal and individual nature and arises from various disputes within States – disputes that are mostly due to a lack of consensus about the country's leadership for a whole range of political, social and economic reasons.

It would perhaps be appropriate to add another factor of insecurity, which is not linked to an armed conflict but is just as dangerous. The factor in question is the dumping in Africa of toxic industrial waste, which destroys the ecological balance of our countries and is life-threatening to our peoples.

Now that we have considered the factors responsible for insecurity and the nature of regional security concerns, let us try to identify the arrangements that the African region has established in order to maintain a certain level of security, even though the arrangements in question have not always functioned as well as they should.

The establishment of OAU in 1963 was in itself a pan-African arrangement resulting to a great extent from the desire on the part of the founders of OAU to maintain security throughout Africa.

In order to guarantee peace and security in Africa at the time of the adoption of the Addis Ababa Charter in 1963, our heads of State and Government placed emphasis on the defence of territorial integrity. One year later, at the Cairo summit, in resolution AHG/Res. 16 (I), they solemnly declared that all Member States pledged themselves to respect

the borders existing at the time of their achievement of national independence.

The call for the maintenance of borders inherited from colonialism was an expression of the importance they attached to peace – first and foremost inside national borders and, secondly, at the regional level. Accordingly, they took steps to co-ordinate and harmonize defence policy.

The co-ordination and harmonization of defence policy is tantamount to consideration of defence and security issues from a regional perspective. It is at this point that the vast and complex domain of geopolitics is entered.

In 1963, at the time of the establishment of OAU, the heads of State and Government had very clear ideas about security issues. The OAU Charter that they adopted constitutes an appropriate political and legal framework for consideration of such issues:

- Political, because it is the expression of the will of our heads of State and Government to defend the sovereignty, integrity and independence of their territory. Political, once again, because they decided to co-ordinate and harmonize their defence policy.

- Legal, because they decided to settle their disputes peacefully, through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. For that purpose, they established a mediation, conciliation and arbitration commission.

Unfortunately, the Commission in question never really functioned, because States Members invariably chose to use *ad hoc* committees. Many *ad hoc* committees were established in an endeavour to settle conflicts and disputes between Member States, for example, the *Ad Hoc* Committees on the Algeria-Morocco, Ethiopia-Somalia, Benin-Gabon, Guinea-Senegal, and Chad-Libya disputes.

In resolution CM/635 (XXXI), the Council of Ministers entrusted the Defence Commission with the task of considering the desirability of establishing an international military force under the aegis of OAU.

It is true that the solemn declaration of the Council of Ministers indicated that the creation of such a force could be envisaged only within the context of OAU's objectives and priorities for the elimination of the racist minority régimes of southern Africa, the total liberation of the continent, and the safeguarding of the independence,

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States. However, the goal of the Council of Ministers was to achieve peace and security in Africa. The guidelines for the establishment of an OAU defence force considered by the Defence Commission at its sixth ordinary session at Addis Ababa in April 1979 revealed the Council's intentions clearly.

Had the force actually come into existence, its role would have been to:

- Assist Member States in the event of acts of aggression coming from outside Africa, including acts of aggression committed by the racist minority régimes of southern Africa;
- Provide assistance in the liberation struggle being waged in African territories still under colonial and racist domination;
- Provide a peace-keeping force to act as a buffer in the event of disputes between Member States;
- Co-operate with the United Nations in the area of Member States' defence and security.

The question of the establishment of an African defence force was reconsidered by the Defence Commission at its eighth session, held at Accra in February 1984. A draft protocol on the establishment of an African defence body resulted from the session in question.

We hope that a final decision will be adopted at the forthcoming meeting of the Defence Commission, which is scheduled to take place at Tripoli from 25 to 31 March 1989.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted by the Assembly of heads of State and Government at its eighteenth session, held at Nairobi in June 1981, also provides a very important legal framework for individual and collective security.

The heads of State and Government – aware of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are goals that must be attained in order to meet the African peoples' legitimate aspirations, on the one hand, and of the impact that they can have on the economy, on the other hand – decided to devote particular attention in the future to the right to development, on the assumption that civil and political rights are inextricable from economic, social and cultural rights, and that ensuring the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights guarantees the enjoyment of civil and political rights.

In order to promote human and peoples' rights and to safeguard such rights, they established an OAU African commission on

human and peoples' rights, with headquarters at Banjul in Gambia, which will soon be operating.

There was also the proposal put forward by the Government of Sierra Leone concerning the establishment of a political security council. This proposal was prompted by OAU's inability to react rapidly in the event of a crisis. It is warranted because of the need to set up permanent OAU machinery to react rapidly with a view to containing conflicts in Africa, without having to await the convening of meetings of the principal OAU bodies. The sponsors of the proposal stressed how difficult it is to convene special sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government or of the Council of Ministers to discuss emergencies.

The Sierra Leonean proposal therefore made provision for the establishment of a 15-member security council that could meet without delay, which would make it possible to circumvent procedural obstacles.

The purpose of the Council would be to:

- Deal with dispatch with any crisis in Africa that might be a threat to peace, security and stability in Africa;

- Promptly adopt effective measures to safeguard peace and prevent the escalation of conflicts, whether political or military.

Unfortunately, the Council of Ministers concluded that the Sierra Leonean proposal was premature and shelved consideration of the matter.

The most successful interregional arrangement, which is the object of admiration throughout Africa, is the Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Matters of Defence (ANAD), signed in June 1977 by six countries members of WAEC, namely, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso (Upper Volta at the time). Togo was to accede to the Agreement at a later date.

ANAD stipulates that force shall not be used to settle disputes between member States and makes provision for mutual assistance in the event of an external act of aggression. Generally speaking, it calls for more co-ordination in the field of defence and for the pooling of the means of guaranteeing both the individual and collective security of member States.

Under ANAD, it proved possible to prevail on Mali and Burkina Faso to put an end to the armed conflict between them and to accept the decision handed down by the International Court of Justice.

Today, peace reigns once again between the two sister republics, which now maintain exemplary relations.

Another interregional arrangement was established in the context of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in the framework of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters.

The States parties to the Protocol declare and accept that any threat of armed aggression or any armed aggression from the exterior directed against any member State constitutes a threat or an act of aggression against the entire community. They undertake to provide one another with aid and assistance on a mutual basis when they need to defend themselves against any threat of armed aggression or any armed aggression.

Furthermore, the Protocol makes provision for special measures where there is an armed conflict between two or more member States, in the event that the procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes proves ineffective. In such an event, the Assembly of Heads of State may decide to use the allied armed forces of the community as a buffer.

I cannot bring my statement to a close without mentioning OAU's position on security concerns linked to development. You will remember that in August 1985 OAU action resulted in the adoption of the Lomé Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa. The corresponding conference was held by OAU in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. It was the first regional political meeting to give member States a valuable opportunity to consider jointly the most crucial issues bearing on Africa's present and future aspirations, as well as strategies for achieving peace and progress.

The Lomé Conference regarded peace and security as the African States' priority goal and an indispensable condition for the achievement of social and economic development.

It affirmed that every State has a legitimate right to security and self-defence. Without question, it is insecurity that obliges States to channel their scarce resources into burdensome military expenditure in order to maintain internal stability and safeguard their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The interdependence of security, disarmament and development is now undeniable. The establishment of interdependence is of fundamental importance in bringing about lasting peace. To achieve that end, it is necessary not only to combat the factors responsible for insecurity, but also to set up preventive arrangements with a view to eliminating all sources of concern and in order to develop the climate of confidence and security required for development.

The impact of new global changes on African security

Essam Eldin Galal

Several international developments in the last couple of years promise to ease some of the more threatening strains that have long affected both international and regional peace and stability.

It is of vital importance to assess the significance of these emerging changes so that overly optimistic thinking will not hinder our endeavour to lay the foundations of a rational, operative, global security arrangement that can effectively meet the still impending threats.

On the strategic level, the entry into force of the USSR-United States Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) has been a noteworthy achievement and so are the USSR's proposals to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and its armaments, including offensive conventional weapons such as tanks, in Europe and to reduce significantly Soviet armed forces in the Asian part of the USSR.

The importance of these developments is not that they reduce appreciably either side's potential for nuclear annihilation. Far from it. Their importance lies in the elimination of provocative and threatening weapons like the Pershing II and SS-20 or in modification of offensive military postures like massive tank deployment along the dividing line between the two military blocs.

These developments, however, do not alter the devastating and annihilating nature of nuclear confrontation. They can be welcomed only in the sense that they provide an opportunity or breathing-space in which we can face up to the basic dangers of the nuclear option. Nuclear weapons are irrelevant as weapons for waging war. Their very nature and the strategy of mutual assured destruction makes them suited not to eliminating antagonisms, but to eliminating the antagonists themselves and the rest of the world. Not only is nuclear confrontation very much

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with us, but the potential for a future flare-up is also very much with us because of the application of technological developments to the arms race.

Africa paid a high price for earlier cycles of heated confrontation. Inherent friction was compounded and exploited in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and northern Africa, to give some examples. Africans can only view with great concern the fundamental instability of the balance of terror that still dominates our globe.

Africa realizes that the missiles eliminated under the INF Treaty represent only a small percentage of the more than 50,000 nuclear warheads possessed by the super-Powers. Moreover, the combined military expenditure of the USSR and the United States exceeds the military expenditures of all other countries, and is supplemented by an astounding expenditure for the military use of R & D, which constitutes an overwhelming proportion of the total global allocation for all types of R & D.

The inevitable emergence of even more destabilizing military technologies can only lead to new conflicts involving Africa. Already many destabilizing technologies are in the pipeline: laser anti-missile weapons, supersonic cruise missiles, mobile strategic missiles, third-generation nuclear warheads, and "moderned" short-range missiles. It is predicted that 50 new weapons systems may be introduced over the next three years.

The current amelioration of the international climate, with its promising arms control negotiations, must not be permitted to be a simple interlude between cycles of confrontation. Africa, together with the rest of the world, must guard against such an eventuality.

A second development of possibly great significance for Africa is the apparent progress being made towards disengagement from direct confrontation in various regional conflicts. As in Afghanistan, Kampuchea and Nicaragua, this is happening in Africa as well. The projected disengagement of Cuban and South African forces promises to end the hemorrhage of Namibia, though Africa has no reason to trust the South African régime or its backers, open and covert.

The agreement reached on the role for the United Nations to play in resolving these confrontations is very encouraging and welcome, but it is simplistic to think we are witnessing the emergence of the rule of international law and its institutions. In fact, parallel with these

developments that promise at least to ease some of Africa's more agonizing injuries, we have witnessed the deformation of some of the basic requirements of multilateralism, for example, the open politicization of the role of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and United Nations agencies like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which serve developing countries.

Africa's urgent and most compelling needs cannot be met by piecemeal and patchy application of international law. Africa has as much vested interest as any other region in helping to uphold the supremacy of international law and its institutions as the only viable and stable basis of a global security system. Obviously the road towards this goal is still long and hazardous.

A third international development, which perhaps poses the most urgent threat to African stability and security, is the economic crisis.

As the latest report of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) indicates, a crisis is undermining basic services like education, health and food as the funds that are needed drop in real value at the same time that the rate of growth of the population approaches 3.8 per cent annually. The debt crisis, strife, and natural disasters like drought, desertification and famine only complicate an already tragic situation.

The basic factor in the crisis of developing countries in general, and of African countries in particular is the deteriorating terms of trade. For example, in 1986 developing countries lost $80 billion due to declining prices for their exports in spite of an actual growth in exports of nearly 3.2 per cent. The purchasing power of African exports declined by 50 per cent from 1980 to 1987 as the terms of trade further deteriorated and protectionism spread in the industrial markets. Difficulties were compounded by exorbitant interest rates and a money supply inadequate to meet the most urgent needs.

An annual decline of 2.7 per cent in per capita growth of income during the same period, 1980 to 1987, was complicated by a population growth rate of 3.3 per cent. Under these conditions, the rate of growth of the debt reached + 6.8 per cent, while the decline in export value reached -6.8 per cent.

The real tragedy is that these trends are predicted to continue in the 1990s, with the expected increase in per capita income, estimated to vary from a low zero to a high 0.7 per cent. Studies of the International Development Center, however, estimate that developing countries need to achieve a growth rate of 10 per cent to 13 per cent simply to meet the basic needs of their populations and to avoid a radical, violent redistribution of income – a sure prescription for instability and insecurity.

Under the circumstances, the debt crisis adds insult to injury. With an estimated negative growth of GNP of -4.6 per cent in the period 1986-1990 and a drop in export earnings, there is no way that an African State can continue to devote 70 per cent of its export receipts simply to the acquisition of further debts to ensure its solvency for one more year. A debt value exceeding 76.2 per cent of GNP and dwindling incomes will only lead to more starvation, disease, illiteracy, undernourishment, bleak prospects and social and political strife – in a word, instability.

It took the Venezuelan uprising to make the United States Government realize that the debt problem is more than a problem of balancing books; it is impossible for many indebted countries in Africa and Latin America to continue bleeding in order to balance the sacred books of the World Bank and the commercial banks. Vague proposals to lighten the debt burden or the interest-rate burden will not ease the agonies of starving and diseased children. Will further catastrophes be needed before the international community will implement changes that are more than cosmetic? Many experts in developing countries believe that this is so. Meanwhile, the intolerable squeeze of World Bank-prescribed adjustments will remain one of the major threats to African stability and security.

The impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament on the African continent

E. A. Azikiwe

Today the prospects of hope and peace have taken a positive turn in international relations. There are good reasons for optimism in regard to the substantial reduction of nuclear and conventional arms the world over. Dramatic developments in the past two years have resulted in the new spirit of co-operation between the two super-Powers, thus facilitating the relaxation of global tension among States. The significant lesson to be derived in the last decade of the twentieth century is that rapid progress in inter-State relations takes place in a climate of trust, confidence, good will and transparency.

I shall examine the impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament on the African continent. There is need to first define the word "disarmament". It is evidently not the total elimination of arms of any kind. Does it mean disarming to the levels of arms required only to maintain domestic order and ward off external aggression? Or does it mean disarming to the levels of arms required for individual self-defence, or collective self-defence? Security is the imperative of disarmament. The basic goal of any State is to ensure its security in order to create an atmosphere of peace and stability. Disarmament could thus mean the elimination of the number and quality of weapons – nuclear, conventional and otherwise – that are clearly not required for the maintenance and protection of a nation's security.

The shape of emerging European security in the light of the bilateral talks between the United States and Soviet Union is of immense interest to the rest of the international community. The key to global peace is no doubt linked with events in Europe. Despite the commendable efforts towards disarmament in general, there is ample

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evidence that sophisticated technologies are still being used for the development of a new generation of conventional and nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons have historically been the major means used in combat and in the protection of national security. However, the introduction and use of atomic bombs during the last days of the First World War, in August 1945, brought a new dimension to the concept of warfare for the first time. With its unique, effective and all-powerful destructive capability, one single atomic bomb suddenly acquired a tremendous explosive force greater than all the conventional weapons used in all wars since the production of gunpowder. The post 1945 breakdown of the Allied Powers' united front against nazism, the disagreement over how to control the atomic bombs then under the monopoly of the United States of America and the consequent rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USSR, the United Kingdom, France and China, in turn, served to underline this new perception of warfare and security.

The emergence of some African States in the international political arena at this time could hardly be expected to be very auspicious. In 1945, when the Second World War ended, only Ethiopia and Liberia were fully independent African States. Thus most African States were still under colonial rule, and sovereign independence did not come until the 1950s and 1960s when the majority attained independence. Even then, while some States gained their independence through relatively bloodless political struggles, others fought militarily against their colonial oppressors for several years before seizing power and acquiring political independence. The struggle of the latter States was mainly conducted by guerilla forces of the indigenous liberation movements using conventional weapons against the more regular forces of the colonial empires.

In essence, Africans could not be divorced from the mainstream of global developments in their concept of warfare and security, as well as their perception of armaments, armed struggle, and military capability as instruments for safeguarding certain basic values and interests. With independence, national sovereignty and the demands of nation-building, however, the imperatives of social and economic development started to temper military-security perception. Thus the early years of independence saw consummate efforts on the part of many African leaders to settle arising boundary disputes, some of which

degenerated into open conflicts involving conventional weapons and considerable destruction accentuating this phase of early independence and boundary squabbles was the unfavourable international political climate which was characterized by an intense arms race, the accumulation of sophisticated armaments through East-West ideological rivalry. These developments, as we know, were not confined to Europe and North America, nor to NATO and Warsaw Pact nations alone: directly or indirectly they affected other countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. In their bid to outdo each other, both the Soviet Union and the United States literally carved the world into their respective spheres of influence and engaged in proxy wars. Thus they became entangled in local conflicts, establishing military bases in different parts of the developing countries to project their military capability, and generously supplied sophisticated conventional armaments to their favourites in order to win political leverage and dislodge recalcitrant leaderships.

While conventional weapons have largely featured in modern African political evolution and development, nuclear weapons have presented a completely different picture. Through a combination of factors ranging from the global horror and genuine disdain which greeted the atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945; the vehement continental condemnation of the French atomic test in the Sahara in 1960; preoccupation with the more urgent tasks of combating socio-economic developmental challenges; and the realistic knowledge of the great danger of a nuclear arms race in Africa, the African States individually and collectively have never been favourably disposed to nuclear weapons.

This lack of attraction to nuclear armaments crystallized in the 1964 Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa during the second summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). That it came to the forefront just a year after the establishment of the continental organization showed the abhorrence that Africa has towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the continent's desire to foster international peace and security. That this objective of the denuclearization of Africa still continues to be pursued, in spite of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability, is a testimony to this resolve. African States constitute the single largest group of signatories to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (PTBT). These are outstanding indications of their commitment to effective, global non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In recent years, the question of *apartheid* South Africa's nuclear ambition has generated considerable debate among African strategic thinkers. There is no doubt that as a citadel of institutionalized racist ideology and given its policy of aggression and destabilization of its neighbours, South Africa could use its nuclear weapon capability as a veritable instrument of military blackmail, if not for an actual onslaught against the peace and security of African States. The series of clandestine technical co-operation and political cover received by South Africa from some Western States, its refusal to join the NPT or place its developed nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and its reported nuclear tests in the South Atlantic have all combined to start eroding the African States' realization of the objectives of their Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. Nevertheless, the general perception still endures that there is no possibility of lasting peace and security in Africa other than through the total absence of nuclear arms from the continent. The current wind of change blowing through South Africa itself may well act as a catalyst in the full realization of the objectives.

In a world of growing interdependence, the challenge to find solutions to the difficult and complex issues of both nuclear and conventional disarmament will require the political will and collective actions of all States, with attention to the specific conditions prevailing in Africa. Whether that could be achieved is another question entirely. Suffice it to say that such a foundation would have to be laid for the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons, including the present stockpiles. It should also cover the total prohibition of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction. It must however be emphasized that while drastic reduction in nuclear and conventional weapons could even be achieved at some stages of global disarmament, conventional disarmament would remain an illusion until we could repose confidence in an international framework that safeguards and protects our national interests and security. In the present system in which some States have assumed the false notion that power is might, and might is right, nuclear disarmament and reduction in the levels of concentration of

conventional weapons will continue to elude us. This notwithstanding, we should continue to affirm the positive role of the United Nations in stimulating awareness of the common interest in strengthening internal peace and security. In this connection, both bilateral and regional efforts can be complementary and mutually supportive.

In Africa, the impact of these efforts and initiatives on nuclear and conventional disarmament should also be understood within the context of prevailing domestic or national challenges facing the totality of the continent, their perception of security in a heavily militarized nuclear world, and lack of meaningful progress in reducing the huge stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons held by the "developing countries". As noted earlier, Africans did assert, and continue to assert their rights to self-determination and national independence. At the same time, African States were becoming, through their role in the United Nations, aware of the influence which they could have in international affairs, especially when they act in a collective and concerted manner.

Africa has been responsive to the bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives on conventional and nuclear disarmament as well as to recent favourable international political developments and their influences on the lessening of tension, the breaking down of ideological rivalry, regional conflicts, and military competitions. Most of these initiatives were, of course, themselves spearheaded, promoted or supported in the United Nations by the developing countries or the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. These initiatives may have accelerated super-Power bilateral talks and regional disarmament treaties which are now heralding the current improved super-Power relations, with the consequent positive global ramifications.

A key impact of these developments has been the awareness, right from the onset, that Africa required a peaceful environment for its orderly development without the large-scale acquisition of conventional weapons. Although wars of liberation, border conflicts, internal crises, and leadership struggles have variously heightened tension and accentuated the acquisition of sophisticated conventional weapons, Africa has remained largely free of the intense conventional arms race characteristic of some other parts of the world. Thus in geopolitical terms, Africa has remained the least militarized continent.

Yesterday, I deliberately decided to provoke further exchange of ideas on the issue of disarmament and development. It was never my intention to present a rather gloomy picture of the way in which the resources freed from armaments could be used for the benefit of mankind. When I mentioned that Africa is not on the agenda of the current improved East-West relations, I was only observing that the traditional donor countries which are now focusing their attention in Eastern Europe expect us to put our house in order. Suffice it to say that no nation can aspire to develop without being self-sufficient. We have been served notice that the era of hand-outs is gradually coming to an end.

Nevertheless, there is now a renewed realization of the relationship between disarmament and development. With limited resources for infrastructural development and the socio-economic welfare of its peoples and as a primary producer of agricultural commodities whose prices are subject to the vagaries of the international market, Africa can least afford the massive, foreign currency outlay needed for purchasing sophisticated armaments. Even though the need to build and equip national armies for defence as well as recurrent political instability in most African States dictated a strong commitment to military expenditures, recent developments since the 1980s have pointed towards a gradual shift from military preoccupations to the application of an integrated approach towards nation-building. This is based on the realization that social and economic welfare constitutes the means of securing the tripod of peace, security and development. Thus, it is now accepted that there are non-military threats to security in Africa, and these are being addressed by most African Governments through the various economic programmes of structural adjustment as well as through mass literacy campaigns. Indeed, enormous expenditure retards growth.

Lastly, the collective political umbrella provided by the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 symbolized the impact of conventional and nuclear disarmament in Africa. By opting for a political rather than a military organization, African States have shown that they would favour political solutions to their problems, while rejecting military solutions or confrontation. The establishment of several regional agencies and subregional economic groupings, all

devoted to non-military functions, shows Africa's preferences for peaceful development and inter-State harmony.

We can only hope that genuine conventional and nuclear disarmament will ultimately be realized. Common sense and human survival point in that direction. The improved East/West relations may well be its harbinger, if the trend continues. But in the face of all odds and against all challenges, Africa has shown the path, in its own modest way, towards peace and development. With border conflicts diminishing and civil strife receding dramatically, Africa is poised to continue de-emphasizing reliance on the use of military force to resolve internal and external crises in the years ahead.

Denuclearization of Africa: overview and update

Omran El-Shafei

In 1964 the African Heads of State and Government adopted, in Cairo, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. However, the development of South Africa's nuclear weapon capability has created an obstacle to the African efforts to elaborate a legally binding instrument following the model of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America.

One may say that the interest of African countries in establishing a nuclear-free zone was first expressed in the early 1960s. Initially, their attention focused on obtaining agreement that the territory of Africa should not be used for nuclear-test explosions and was related to the plans of France to carry out a series of tests in the Sahara. Later on, the concept was broadened. Thus at the 1964 Cairo Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Heads of State and Government issued the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, in which they solemnly declared their readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire atomic weapons and they appealed to all peace-loving countries to accept the same undertaking and to all nuclear Powers to respect the Declaration and conform to it. By its resolution 2033 (XX) the General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed the Declaration on 3 December 1965.

Twelve years after the Declaration by the OAU, on 10 December 1976, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 31/69 in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and every year since then the General Assembly has adopted resolutions reiterating that appeal by the international community.

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Meanwhile, grave concern has been expressed by the international community at South Africa's nuclear capability. Beginning in 1976, in the context of its discussion on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, the General Assembly has paid particular attention to developments related to activities of South Africa in the nuclear field and has adopted resolutions on the matter.

On 11 December 1979, as a result of a report indicating that a small nuclear explosion might have been conducted in the area of the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, the General Assembly, in its resolution 34/76 B, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on South Africa's plan and its capability in the nuclear field. The study, prepared by a group of experts in 1980, stated, *inter alia*, that "there is no doubt that South Africa has the technical capability to make nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery."[1] The group expressed the view that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the African continent and particularly into such a volatile region as southern Africa would not only be a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation, but would also upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from the nuclear arms race and make it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The General Assembly, for its part, has adopted resolutions on the issue in all recent years.

In 1983, the General Assembly in its resolution 38/181 A, requested the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and in consultation with the OAU, to provide data on the continued development of South Africa's nuclear capability. A report was submitted to the Assembly in 1984.[2] In his report in 1987,[3] the Secretary-General referred to information provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the development of the situation regarding South Africa's nuclear capability. The Director-General of IAEA provided the Secretary-General with updated information on this subject. The position of the Government of South Africa with regard to negotiations on the question of its accession to the non-proliferation Treaty was also referred to. It appears that South Africa is prepared to commence negotiations with each of the nuclear-weapon States on the possibility of signing the Treaty. South Africa spelt out its concerns: rights and privileges in terms of article IV of the Treaty, particularly as they relate to the exchange of equipment, materials and technology; the ability of South Africa, should it accede, to market uranium

commercially like all other producers, subject only to IAEA or equivalent safeguards; what South Africa considers to be discriminatory domestic legislation currently existing in a number of countries signatories of the non-proliferation Treaty that is contrary to the principles embodied in several articles of the Treaty; United Nations resolutions which called for a complete ban on nuclear co-operation with South Africa; South Africa's credentials at IAEA General Conferences and review conferences of the non-proliferation Treaty; and the discriminatory nature of the NPT in so far as it distinguished between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

It appears also that a meeting took place between the depositaries of the Treaty and South Africa and a statement by the depositaries was addressed to the thirty-second General Conference of IAEA, maintaining the position that South Africa should adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible.

The General Assembly, at both its forty-third and forty-fourth sessions, expressed its grave concern at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability. In its resolution 44/113 A of 15 December 1989 it called upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to resist from further collaboration with the racist régime that might enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. It also appealed to all States that had the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research, development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard.

As for the recent reports which indicated collaboration between South Africa and Israel, resulting in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile, the General Assembly, in its resolution 44/113 B, of 15 December 1989, after expressing its great concern at this development, requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, to investigate these reports, bearing in mind their implications for the implementation of the policy of denuclearization of Africa and for the security of African States and, in particular, the front-line and other neighbouring States.

Regarding the implementation of the Declaration, the General Assembly, in its resolution 44/113 A of 15 December 1989, continued also to demand that South Africa should refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use

nuclear weapons. It demanded that South Africa should submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by IAEA.

The General Assembly reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the OAU might seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa. The OAU requested its member States to submit to its Secretary-General their views and comments on the implementation of the Declaration, including the drafting of a relevant convention or treaty.

Although such views and comments on the part of the member States of the OAU will clarify many substantive and procedural issues relevant to the preparation of a legally binding convention or treaty, the exploration of the attitudes of the nuclear Powers *vis-à-vis* a denuclearized Africa is essential and could be problematic as well. The position of the Government of South Africa continues to be crucial in initiating the necessary process to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

As a region, Africa was the first to take a regional position on nuclear proliferation. The French nuclear testing in the Sahara during the 1960s presented Africa with a problem. A number of individual countries broke diplomatic relations with France. An attempt was made in the United Nations to censure French nuclear tests. The subject was so central in African thinking that once the OAU was established, one of the first measures taken by the new regional organization was to issue the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

As a region also, Africa is the only entity to adopt non-alignment in its external relations with the rest of the world. The reasoning behind such a policy is to avoid as much as possible, the consequences of involvement in the cold war and the arms race.

In reality, Africa could not escape the impact of confrontational policies between the two super-Powers and their respective allies. As a result of the increasing external pressures, African efforts to establish a collective security system were undermined. The process of militarization was becoming established in Africa. The continent has been rife with major wars in southern Africa, the Horn, Western Sahara and Chad. Outside Powers have intervened militarily in the affairs of the continent. South Africa has greatly increased and

expanded its *apartheid* war machine and has been increasingly prepared to use it.

However, unlike the situation in other regions, there are no competing and ideologically antagonistic military alliances in Africa. Therefore, the introduction of a régime based on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is in conformity with African global interests and could enhance the security of individual African States as well as that of the region as a whole. The OAU, with its membership embracing all of the independent African States (except South Africa) offers a unique opportunity to promote bilateral and multilateral relations among African States. It could also be a useful vehicle for collective action between the African States and the extra-zonal nuclear Powers for the purpose of laying the groundwork for implementation of the Declaration.

It is obvious that once African security concerns are met, Africa has no interest in being part of an arms race, particularly a nuclear one.

Such an assessment must be made in the context of a major development crisis in Africa, the impact of which has been especially severe for the continent as a whole. During the 1980s most African States, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, had plunged into an unprecedented economic and social crisis, the dimensions, impact and implications of which went far beyond African borders. African external debt added to the heavy burden, frustrating any serious effort to bring about sound economic development.

To deal with this crisis, Africa requires huge sums of financial aid, investment and loans. It requires, above all, stability and security, which would guarantee the full employment of its human and natural resources for the benefit of economic and social development.

The continuing struggle for liberation is concentrated in southern Africa and is epitomized by the *apartheid* régime of South Africa. The policy pursued by that régime challenges the whole course of development in Africa through its determination to perpetuate a racial and colonial policy.

Africa's security concerns are aggravated by South Africa's military buildup. South Africa's military power represents, indeed, a fundamental challenge to the entire OAU system. The efforts to bring about a denuclearized Africa are threatened by the fact that South

Africa is believed to have developed its own nuclear weapons capability or at least a capacity to produce one.

Several factors coincided in the course of the past year to produce a feeling both inside and outside South Africa that there should be an interval in which to give the present leadership in South Africa a chance. In the last year or two, South Africa appeared less arrogant and more amenable to influence from outside. South Africa withdrew from Angola and the process leading to the independence of Namibia had been completed. The changes instituted in South Africa are essentially a relaxation of the enforcement of certain security regulations and segregation laws. They have provided no movement so far on the main issue of political power-sharing. Therefore, it is too premature to suggest what particular pattern, if any, the ongoing changes will follow in the future.

This raises a series of questions about the implication of such changes on developments inside and outside South Africa, the relations with its neighbours, its concept of security, including its nuclear programmes and policies, and finally its attitude with regard to the nuclear non-proliferation régime of the NPT and its position with regard to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and its implementation. Whatever attitude South Africa will take with regard to the above-mentioned and other related issues, the measures and conditions which brought about these changes must be maintained and encouraged.

I referred earlier and very briefly to the talks which have taken place between the Government of South Africa and the depositaries of the NPT and to the statement issued by the depositaries addressed to the thirty-second IAEA General Conference, maintaining the position that South Africa should adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible. These talks should continue to clarify the issues involved with a view to South Africa's agreement to conclude safeguards agreement with IAEA, under the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty to which it should accede.

A positive decision in this regard will remove the doubt and mistrust on the part of African countries *vis-à-vis* South Africa and will help initiate a serious and responsible process of normalization of relations. South Africa's action in this regard should be part of any process of reconciliation.

The unilateral renunciation of the right to develop nuclear weapons was undertaken by the African countries members of the OAU the moment they adopted the Declaration in 1964. The concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a major component of a non-proliferation régime owes a great deal to the African initiative.

Denuclearization of the region should not prejudice the right of the parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The main provisions of a treaty binding all African States, including South Africa, should focus on the obligations of the parties concerned.

In my view, such obligations should include:

(a) The undertaking of the member States to prohibit in their respective territories the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapon;

(b) The undertaking not to receive, store, install and/or deploy in any form any nuclear weapon;

(c) The undertaking to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon;

(d) Finally, the undertaking to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction.

Obviously, such a treaty with its additional protocols should create a system of common rights and obligations among States of the region and those extra-regional States whose support for it is crucial. Extraterritorial States would undertake to respect fully the status of denuclearization established by the treaty. They would also pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the parties to it.

The treaty should prevent parties to it from transporting or allowing the transportation by non-parties through their territories, airspace or seas, of nuclear weapons. Finally, the treaty should have a protocol whereby the nuclear-weapon States would jointly guarantee African States parties to the treaty security from attack with nuclear weapons either from within or outside the continent. The treaty should also provide for a joint African effort to explore the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which has been recognized as the inalienable right of all countries.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, States of the region that have not yet joined the NPT should as a matter of urgency become parties and conclude safeguards agreements. They should submit all of their nuclear facilities to the international safeguards system of IAEA. States beyond the region should inform the Director-General of the IAEA of all significant nuclear materials or components exported to States of the region, including South Africa.

The process of implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa can only be carried through several phases. We have suggested earlier that the talks between the Government of South Africa and the depositaries of the NPT should resume with a view to clarifying the issues involved for the accession of South Africa to the NPT, and IAEA should be informed regularly about the results of these talks, if it is not itself a party to the talks. Through the Agency, the international community and individual African States, could follow the progress of these meetings.

On the other hand, African States, through the OAU, should start exploring the positions of the nuclear-weapon States as far as the preparatory work for the establishment of the zone is concerned. At a later stage, the OAU could, depending on the results achieved, initiate the process of negotiating a legally binding treaty for the denuclearization of Africa.

Finally, there are two sets of proposals which will affect the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The first set comprises the efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Many African countries contingent to the Indian Ocean will benefit ultimately from the establishment of such a zone. The second set comprises the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Fortunately, both issues have been considered and still are being considered by the United Nations. Any positive development in the process of achieving the purposes of these two proposals will have a positive impact as well on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

Notes

1. *South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.1.10), para. 87.
2. United Nations document A/39/470.
3. United Nations document A/42/649.

Chemical weapons: an African point of view

Esmat A. Ezz

Introduction

Modern chemical warfare agents can influence war operations in all kinds of possible scenarios. They can be used effectively against all kinds of targets on the battlefield or behind the lines against military or civilian installations as well as in industrial and urban areas. Once chemical weapons are used, there will be no differentiation between military forces and civilian population. A chemical attack could be intentionally directed against civilian targets behind the lines in order to deprive the enemy of its working power, demoralize the masses and create panic among them. As a matter of fact, casualties among civilians would be very much greater than among the military as the latter are usually equipped and trained to protect themselves in a chemical attack and they are provided with decontamination materials and specialized first : kits.

Efforts to curb chemical weapons have the longest history of any in the field of arms control, dating back as they do to the Hague Conventions adopted at the turn of the century. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 is the oldest arms-control agreement now in force. More than 120 nations adhere to it. It outlaws the use (but not the possession) of chemical weapons. The Protocol has been interpreted by many States, including the United States, as a prohibition against first-use of chemical weapons. These States reserve the right to retaliate if another country initiates chemical warfare. The capacity to retaliate is among the factors that have kept chemical warfare in check in major conflicts, including the Second World War. Yet, as long as chemical weapons exist, the temptation to use them will also exist. This is why, the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been conducting substantial

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negotiations since the late 1970s to conclude a convention imposing a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Roots of instability and tensions in Africa

Besides the legitimate wars of independence and liberation movements, several wars had erupted in many parts of Africa after countries attained independence. In most of the cases, the former colonial Powers and/or one or both of the two major Powers were directly or indirectly involved in these wars. Besides ideological differences, competition for strategic and/or economic interests in Africa has created areas of instability and tensions. In many instances, conflicts, aggression and even wars occur because some countries depend on the support of its ex-colonial Power or one of the two major Powers. In most cases, the African countries – and even factions of people of the same nation, as in the case of Angola – have been used in the confrontation between the major Powers. Last but not least, the *apartheid* régime in South Africa constitutes a major cause of instability in the region and in the front-line States. An added threat to African security is the possession of nuclear weapons by South Africa in the south and by Israel to the north.

Other causes of instability and conflict in Africa are ethnic and religious in nature. Although it is customary to relate these problems to the colonial era, it is evident that after about thirty years of independence, and in spite of the efforts of the Organization of African Unity, many of these problems still exist.

The security needs of African countries

Peace and security are the highest objective of any State. It is evident that the majority of the African countries have been diverting a good share of their meagre resources to meet the burdens of military expenditure, which they consider necessary to deal with threats to their own security. Military buildup would guarantee security only if it were of sufficiently high quality and quantity to deter the type of attack to which the country could be exposed. Even in the absence of military balance between two adversaries, it can be effective if the weaker side is capable

of inflicting qualitative and quantitative damage which the other side cannot tolerate. Why are almost all African countries spending much more than they can afford on weapons? It is the feeling of insecurity. Each country tries to establish a military buildup of a size and quality comparable to those of the adversary and if possible superior to it in order to serve as a deterrent. In some situations, the military balance is either quantitatively or qualitatively in favour of one side. This could tempt the other side to try to reverse this imbalance by acquiring a generation of weapons which the other side has not acquired or cannot acquire. For some of these countries, it has been the capability of their adversary to conduct a "decisive offensive" that has been of greatest concern. Seeking to eliminate this capability, the weaker side may resort to the use of chemical weapons as a deterrent or possibly as a counter-offensive to destroy an aggressor.

The military value of chemical weapons

Chemical weapons have the basic potential capability mentioned above, but the question is: Can chemical weapons in the hands of one or both adversaries in Africa serve as a deterrent? Experience says "No".

Another question is: Can chemical weapons be used as a counter-offensive to destroy an aggressor? From recent experience, some analysts say "Yes", particularly, if the other side is not trained and equipped to fight under the possible use of chemical weapons, or if it does not have the capability to retaliate in kind. Other analysts insist that the limited, but spectacular, recent use of chemical weapons did not have the decisive character some have attributed to it.

There are countries which argue that, if some countries which possess the most sophisticated conventional nuclear weapons are not only maintaining their chemical arsenal but also continuously modernizing it, in spite of the fact that they are actively engaged in negotiations aimed at conclusion of a convention banning such weapons, then these weapons must be of great military value. Some of these countries even speak of maintaining what they term "security stocks" of chemical weapons after the conclusion of such convention. This at least would make the idea of acquiring such weapons very appealing to

countries which do not have them and at the same time do not have or could not have sophisticated conventional or nuclear weapons

Confronted with the nuclear threat to African countries by the *apartheid* régime in the south and by Israel in the north, some countries are tempted to "go chemical" to redress what they consider as intolerable and unjust imbalance with their neighbours which have the nuclear bomb, in spite of the non-proliferation Treaty to which they adhere: they feel that it offers them no security. They argue, "What is an alternative to nuclear weapons for a country which cannot obtain such weapons, and is under the threat of the use of these weapons by an adversary?" Some countries even ask, "Why do you want to eliminate a weapon that both of us have or can have, while you do not want to give up a weapon that you possess and that I do not and cannot possess?" The question is whether chemical weapons could practically serve as a deterrent against a nuclear attack. No one can question that there are huge differences between the destructive power of the nuclear weapons and that of chemical weapons, but some argue that in a situation where a country cannot acquire nuclear weapons and is being threatened or attacked by such weapons, and if that country has nothing at hand to face such situation except chemical weapons, or can acquire them, it would be foolish for it not to resort to such an option to deter the threat of nuclear attack or even to retaliate after such an attack in order to inflict on the aggressor as much punishment as possible.

Legal control of weapons in armed conflicts

In spite of the fact that the choice of weapons in armed conflicts is regulated by international law and by other relevant treaties, we have been witnessing deliberate violations of these rules and regulations. Perhaps this is because, as J.P. Robinson once put it, some hold that when the national security is at stake, international treaties are bound to take a very second place to national self-interest, so much so that arms-control or disarmament agreements are unlikely to have much practical influence: they will be observed only when that is expedient.

The spread of weapons of mass destruction has created a great deal of instability and destabilization in the world and constitutes a continuous threat to the security of countries which do not possess such weapons. This is particularly true in conflict-ridden regions.

Possession of biological weapons is prohibited by the 1972 biological weapons Convention. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. There is no legal instrument which prohibits the use of nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation Treaty was meant to prohibit proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Africa and weapons of mass destruction

It is generally known that almost all African countries except the *apartheid* régime have joined the non-proliferation Treaty and that no African country has tried to acquire nuclear weapons. Also most African countries are members of the 1972 biological weapons Convention. In practical terms, most, if not all of the African countries, have no capacity to produce nuclear or biological weapons. On the other hand, the technology for the production of chemical weapons is within the reach of many African countries, at least the less sophisticated types. But the current international environment directed towards solving conflicts by negotiation rather than confrontation and the logical tendency to direct all national resources towards development instead of military buildup are hopeful signs that the spread of chemical weapons in Africa is very remote. African countries have been actively engaged in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the United Nations aimed at conclusion of the chemical weapon convention.

At the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons held in January 1989, many developing countries supported the global efforts to impose a total ban on chemical weapons, but they asked that the chemical weapons convention should include effective security guarantees for its members, not only against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons but also against the use or the threat of use of any weapon of mass destruction. Egypt's Minister for Foreign Affairs said:

> "It would not be logical for the international community to permit some countries in the most sensitive regions of the world the nuclear option without the least international control, while the same international community demands the total prohibition of chemical weapons. We consider that the progress in the field of prohibition of chemical weapons is linked to the realization of a parallel prohibition on the level of nuclear weapons."

Is there a solution?

Perhaps the logical solution is to work out a practical and reliable system for collective international security under which all countries would feel safe and secure against the threat or use of any weapon of mass destruction. The question is whether this could be politically feasible.

Another solution, one which is more practical and could solve the particular concerns of countries in the regions where the nuclear threat exists, is to establish a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction. For the last several years we have been asking for the establishment of Africa as a zone free from weapons of mass destruction under effective international guarantees. President Mubarak called recently for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. I am sure that his call could be extended to cover the whole of the African continent.

Disarmament verification and its contribution to the theory of international control: a legal study

Sayed Anwar Abou Ali

Whether a dangerous utopia or an absolute imperative, in the early twentieth century disarmament moved from the realm of intellectual debate to that of diplomacy and of relations among States. Action for disarmament was reinforced by the creation of the League of Nations, which, after the Second World War, became the United Nations.

The devastation wrought by the First World War gave rise to the first large-scale attempt to set up a system of arms control to prevent unbridled competition among States. Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant recognized that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations". It was to that end that, in 1932, the League convened the Disarmament Conference, but without success.

After the Second World War, horror at the magnitude of the disaster wrought by selfishness and human stupidity prompted mankind to set up a new organization, the United Nations, endowed with a system of collective security that could ensure the maintenance of peace and play a catalytic role in promoting peaceful relations among States and discouraging aggression. The abolition of weapons other than those necessary for national defence and for the maintenance of a capacity for international collective action was to be a secondary element of that system. Under Article 47 of the Charter, a military staff committee was to assist the Security Council on questions relating to the regulation of armaments, while under Article 11 the General Assembly was

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to consider the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations thereon. Thus, when the United Nations was planned, disarmament as such was not envisaged as one of the Organization's priorities.

With the use of the atomic bomb against Japan, however, the concept of disarmament and the approach to it changed. The first sessions of the United Nations General Assembly gave top priority to the elimination of atomic weapons. On 24 January 1946, a General Assembly resolution established an Atomic Energy Commission responsible for making proposals for the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, while in 1947 the Security Council established a Commission for Conventional Armaments. Thus, it was not long before the disarmament principles absent from the Charter came to be formulated. Rather than focusing on specific weapons systems, a global approach was to be taken to disarmament. Under that approach, verification always went hand in hand with prohibition.

The end pursued

The rationale of a system of control in the area of disarmament is to ensure that the contracting parties to a given treaty fulfil the commitments set forth in that treaty. Those commitments can vary according to the purpose of the treaty and the prohibition it imposes, which may be non-use or non-proliferation. In the case of non-proliferation, the prohibition applies to a whole set of activities ranging from the development to the production, improvement or stockpiling of the weapon in question. This explains the observation that non-proliferation is the area of choice for the introduction of verification systems – one has only to mention the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. By contrast, the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare makes no provision for verification. It is difficult to implement a system to verify non-use in wartime, while non-proliferation is verified far from the battlefield.

Another observation is prompted by the complexity of the technical data specific to certain areas where it is difficult to distinguish between military and peaceful uses. This is particularly true of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, because no clear-cut or easy distinction can be made between peaceful and military uses in the nuclear and chemical spheres. There is an interplay between the two spheres, because military and peaceful uses may both be based on the same research. This is especially marked in the nuclear sphere and is one of the things which demonstrates the difference, if not the contrast, between the nuclear and the conventional spheres. In the conventional sphere, it is easy to make a clear-cut distinction between military and peaceful uses: a battleship is obviously not a merchant navy vessel, and a tank has nothing in common with a truck. Of course, even in the conventional area, peaceful and military uses can sometimes overlap, as in the case of the construction of an oil tanker which could be used for either purpose. However, the consequences of this overlapping are far less serious in the conventional sphere than in the nuclear sphere, which is why a degree of tolerance can be shown if the overlapping results in a disarmament violation, as long as the violation does not lead to decisive testing in combat.

The situation is totally different in the nuclear sphere. If a State produces nuclear weapons from fissionable materials provided to it under article IV of the NPT, the State is violating both its obligations as a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and the provisions of the safeguards agreement concluded between it and IAEA. Because of its potentially irreversible consequences, given the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons, such a violation could not be tolerated. As a result, diversions from the authorized use must not be allowed in the area of disarmament in general and in the area of weapons of mass destruction in particular; the function of a verification system is to prevent such diversion.

To sum up, I would say that, from the legal standpoint, the end pursued is to ensure that the parties to an agreement fulfil the commitments they have made in both the military sphere and the sphere of peaceful uses in order to prevent any diversion.

I should also like to point out, however, that the end as defined renders the scope of the control limited and partial, limited because it is restricted to States parties to the convention establishing the verification

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system and there is at present no universal or comprehensive verification system in the area of disarmament, and partial because general and complete disarmament has yet to be achieved.

Activities subject to control

As I just said, activities subject to control or verification relate either to non-use or to non-proliferation. Few controls have been introduced in the area of non-use. The most famous ban we might mention here is that embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 but, unfortunately, that ban was not accompanied by any control mechanisms. This prompted the United Nations to give the Security Council the power to order investigations in the event of serious allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons. These investigations, carried out under the responsibility of the Secretary-General, are designed to clarify the situation so that the Security Council can take the necessary decisions.

In the area of non-proliferation, several treaties have established verification systems specific to the parties to those treaties. Such verification normally covers the production, development, improvement and stockpiling of the weapons in question and the non-diversion to a military industry of materials used in a peaceful industry.

Verification measures

There are two main categories of verification measures: national and international.

National control is the authority vested in a State so that it can verify that domestic firms are fulfilling the commitments made by that State to other States. The Soviet-American SALT agreements (resulting from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) advocated this kind of control. However, such a system reflects a measure of distrust among the parties to an agreement and may arouse considerable suspicion and result in accusations being levelled by each State at the other. At the domestic level, such a system can be qualified and applied only on an administrative basis.

International control varies according to whether it is entrusted to a subject of international public law in the conventional sense, namely, to a State, or whether it is entrusted to an institution. In the former case, the control is subjective because its system will be put into effect only if the controlling State is able and willing to do so. One example would be article VI of the 1972 biological weapons Convention. Institutional control by a specialized international body, on the other hand, involves the objective implementation of a permanent technical system of administrative control, as in the case of the system established by the NPT.

The objectivity of such a system of control derives from the fact that, since it is no longer a State that is responsible for putting the control mechanism into effect, the mechanism is triggered automatically when certain specific situations arise. Further, the control is administrative because of the powers vested in the control authority. By its very nature, administrative control involves continuous monitoring. It is not just restricted to verifying whether a single juridical act is legal or illegal, but involves reviewing all the activities of a given State in a branch of domestic Government that is subject to supervision by international bodies: in the case of the NPT, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons under the IAEA safeguards system. The administrative control exercised by IAEA is, in fact, designed to prevent subjects of law (i.e. States subject to control) from violating provisions on the exercise of powers rather than provisions on the attribution of powers. Since this is a treaty which is vitally important to the international community, a way must be found of safeguarding the common interests governed by it in order to ensure that they prevail.

This is especially necessary in areas which come under the exclusive jurisdiction of a single State but in which the major interests of the international community converge. Those interests can then be protected by legal procedures: the creation of an international administration to take the place of national organs in enforcing the treaty indirectly or in instituting a system of international control to monitor implementation by the State. The NPT opted for the latter procedure, in other words, parties to the Treaty entrusted IAEA with exercising permanent specific control over the management of common interests. What we have here, then, is institutional, technical monitoring fitted for verifying whether States subject to the Agency's control are

fulfilling their obligations. Control, in this case, takes the form of joint enforcement: simultaneous implementation by the international community and by individual States.

In fact, any control of this kind encroaches on the exclusive competence of States, which is why the latter resist the introduction of effective international control. Here, we face a dilemma: on the one hand, scientific progress shows that the anarchy of national sovereignties is incompatible with the needs of modern society; on the other hand, the establishment of an effective international order encounters resistance from national interests. Nationalism, embodied in the concept of sovereignty, usually resists internationalization or international control, which is a weakened form of internationalization. Because of social fragmentation that persists in international society, international control can be exercised only where a balance has been established between States' conflicting interests.

The different administrative control procedures available under international law, which include preventive measures (examination of plans, approval of technical procedures), verification measures (reports, surveys of operations, inspection) and sanctions, have in common the fact that they involve reviewing the way in which an organ under domestic law has complied with international law in exercising the powers vested in it by that international law. Such control involves as it were, verifying that the activity of States parties to a convention is in keeping with the terms of the convention which permit and regulate that activity.

The vital importance of institutional control lies in the fact that it is both technical and permanent, two characteristics which are the best guarantees of its effectiveness. Permanent technical control is designed to ensure strict observance of fixed rules and to monitor such observance either continuously or at least with considerable regularity. Such control is technical in that it is impartial and impersonal, but it is also permanent in that it is exercised on a continuous or least at a regular basis, regardless of any special circumstances which might arise.

Lastly, if the legal construction of international control lends impetus to the theory of international control and to that of international administration, the success of such control also depends on the way in which States behave towards it.

Annex I

Statement made on behalf of the participants

It is with a somewhat heavy heart that I take the floor on behalf of my colleagues and friends to express our deep appreciation to you for the sacrifices you made in order to organize this seminar, which is now drawing to a close, and to see to it that it ran smoothly.

Special thanks are due to all the Egyptian people, the Egyptian Government and, especially, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having invited us to this seminar, for the warm welcome they extended to us and for all the kindness they have shown us since we set foot in the land of the pharaohs. We also wish to thank our colleagues from the Institute for Diplomatic Studies and those responsible for the practical arrangements of the seminar, particularly Mrs. Ragaa and Mrs. Mariam, who every day were at our sides. Thanks to them, we discovered the wonders of Egypt's ancient civilization and its tourist treasures on excursions and visits that will remain engraved in our memories.

We are also grateful to the professors, ambassadors, researchers and other experts who shared with us their experiences, their concerns and their hopes through their fine papers, which we will not easily forget.

After three weeks of living side by side, exchanging ideas, sharing in friendship and brotherhood, it is the hope of all the participants that the positive results of the seminar will not be consigned to oblivion. Our experience inspires us to forge a chain of solidarity through which we can unify our thought and action for the sake of our big, beautiful and rich continent Africa.

As diplomats, we bear a heavy historical and professional responsibility for the destiny of Africa in general and for each of our States in particular.

This statement was made by junior officials and diplomats attending the seminar.

In the historical sense, we have no right to forget that our ancestors suffered bitterly from the slave trade, that our grandfathers were ruined by colonization, that our fathers fought for an independence which our elders managed as best they could in the early decades, and that it is incumbent on us to lead Africa to the gates of the twenty-first century, in dignity and honour. In this undertaking, our historical responsibility as actors in the present meshes with our professional responsibility. The end of the 1980s affords us an opportunity to play a decisive role on the continental and international scene, for traditional political and economic structures are changing and there can be no doubt that we are witnessing a new beginning in international relations. What changes can we see in international relations? We all know what they are, and the organizers of this seminar know even better than we do. Nonetheless, with your permission, we shall briefly recall some of the changes: first, the political thaw and, secondly, the economic thaw.

By "political thaw", we mean détente or rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, symbolized by the meetings between the leaders of those two countries. We also mean the consultations between China and the Soviet Union that are being held with a view to normalizing relationships between the super Powers.

Another aspect is the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to put an end to or find a negotiated settlement for certain conflicts and hotbeds of tension. As examples we can cite the Iran-Iraq war, the signing of the Brazzaville Protocol and the New York agreements between Angola, South Africa, Cuba and the United States for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan territory and Namibia's accession to independence, and the initiation of dialogue between the United States Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The political thaw also encompasses the negotiations for the peaceful reunification of Korea. In the context of the political thaw, we should like to extend our heartiest congratulations to Egypt on its diplomacy for peace, which has resulted in the return of the Taba enclave to Egyptian sovereignty. We are particularly pleased and honoured to have been witnesses to this political, diplomatic and legal triumph during our stay in Egypt.

The economic thaw is reflected in the recent agreement on co-operation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the decision

by the Soviet Union to expand its contacts with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and to phase-in a convertible rouble. The resumption of Arab-African co-operation could be another example of the economic thaw.

This list would not be complete if we did not mention that one of the major trends of our era is the formation of large groupings: the EEC will be unified in 1992.

This, more or less, is the new beginning as we see it, and it will have to be reckoned with in international relations. Therefore, each and every one of us present, regardless of his or her political beliefs, must accept the transformation which is taking place before our eyes, pay attention to it and act accordingly.

That is why we pledge ourselves to a diplomacy for development, a diplomacy for peace, so that, after the year 2000, our African continent will no longer be the continent of economic slump or of children with bellies distended by malnutrition, still less the continent whose landscapes are cracked and seared by drought and desertification.

For this to happen, we want and will fight for a united Africa, an Africa where democracy reigns, an Africa whose rulers will no longer remain perpetually in power, an Africa where the Western countries will no longer dump their industrial wastes – in short, a free, independent and prosperous Africa. We must organize so that Africa, as a political and economic entity, can, through its cohesiveness, its economic organization and its overall policy, command and force the respect of the other major world blocs. We believe that we should make use of OAU, the organization that represents our continent, to achieve this goal.

In that sense, the Cairo meeting, of which we are the lucky beneficiaries, is a starting-point for a better understanding of the challenges which face our continent as the twentieth century draws to a close and the twenty-first century dawns. We leave Cairo better prepared to take up these various challenges and more aware of the tasks which lie before us and of what our duties are.

Long live African unity!

Long live Arab-African co-operation!

Annex II

Seminar on African disarmament and security

Cairo, Egypt, 20-23 March 1989

Monday, 20 March

a.m. **Opening of the seminar**
Ambassador Fawzi El-Ibrashi
Director, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, Egypt

Inaugural address
H.E. Esmat Abdel Meguid
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Arms limitation and disarmament in the United Nations: perspectives and prospects
Mr. Yasushi Akashi
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations, New York

p.m. **The Concept of Multilateral Disarmament**
Ambassador Olu Adeniji
Ambassador of Nigeria to France

Showing of United Nations films on disarmament

Tuesday, 21 March

a.m. **The United Nations and disarmament: an overview**
Ms. Angela Knippenberg
Co-ordinator, World Disarmament Campaign
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Priorities, positions and role of African States in disarmament and security issues in multilateral forums
Ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi
Permanent Representative of Egypt to the
United Nations, New York

The impact of new global changes on African security
Dr. Essam Eldin Galal
Secretary-General of the Egyptian and African Pugwash

p.m. **The impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament on the African continent**
Ambassador Olu Adeniji
Ambassador of Nigeria to France

Disarmament verification and its contribution to the theory of international control: a legal study
H.E. Mr. Sayed Anwar Abou Ali
Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Director
Department of International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Wednesday, 22 March

a.m. **Current important issues on the international disarmament agenda: chemical weapons, nuclear disarmament, verification, CBMs, East-West issues**
Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail
Deputy Chief of Geneva Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Security concerns in the African region and intraregional arrangements
Ambassador Mamadou Bah
Director, Political and Organization Department
Organization of African Unity

p.m. **The international control of chemical weapons**
Major-General Ezmat A. Ezz
Egyptian Armed Forces (Retired)

The work of the World Disarmament Campaign and regional centres for peace and disarmament
Ms. Angela Knippenberg
Co-ordinator, World Disarmament Campaign
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Thursday, 23 March

a.m. **Denuclearization of Africa and nuclear capability of South Africa: overview and update**
Ambassador Mamadou Bah
Director, Political and Organization Department
Organization of African Unity

Disarmament, development and security: a United Nations perspective
Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail
Deputy Chief of Geneva Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Round-up and closing

Seminar on African disarmament and security

Cairo, Egypt, 6-10 May 1990

Sunday 6, May

10:00-14:00 **Opening of the seminar**
Ambassador Fawzi El-Ibrashi
Director, Institute for Diplomatic Studies, Egypt

Inaugural address
Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Arms limitation & disarmament in the world today
Mr. Prvoslav Davinic
Chief, Monitoring, Analysis and Studies Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
(representing the Under-Secretary-General
for Disarmament Affairs)

Strengthening political co-operation through multilateral disarmament
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus
Swedish Delegation to the CFE Negotiations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Monday, 7 May

10:00-14:00 **The impact of nuclear and conventional disarmament on the African continent**
Ambassador E. A. Azikiwe
Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office in Geneva, and
Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament

The issue of nuclear waste
Professor Dr. Hisham Fouad Aly
Chairman, Laboratory and Radioactive
Waste Management Centre
Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority
and
Ambassador E. A. Azikiwe

The United Nations in the field of disarmament: an overview
Mr. Prvoslav Davinic
Chief, Monitoring, Analysis and Studies Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

The United Nations work in disarmament:

Study on nuclear weapons
Ambassador Mohamed El-Shaffei Abdel Hamid
Former Under-Secretary of State of Egypt

Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Ambassador Omran El-Shafei
Former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt

Study on arms transfers
Ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi
Former Permanent Representative of Egypt
to the United Nations, New York

Tuesday, 8 May

10:00 - 14:00 **Current important issues on the international disarmament agenda: conventional disarmament, nuclear disarmament, chemical weapons, CBMs, etc.**
Ambassador Chusei Yamada
Ambassador of Japan to Egypt

Negative security assurances
Ambassador E. A. Azikiwe
Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the
United Nations Office in Geneva

Priorities, positions and role of African States in disarmament and security issues in multilateral forums
Ambassador Abdel Halim Badawi
Former Permanent Representative of Egypt
to the United Nations, New York

Security concerns in the African region and intraregional arrangements
Ambassador Mamadou Bah
Director, Department of Politics
Organization of African Unity

Wednesday, 9 May

10:00 - 14:00 **Denuclearization of Africa: overview and update**
Ambassador Omran El-Shafei
Former Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
and
Ambassador Mamadou Bah
Director, Department of Politics
Organization of African Unity

Ban on Chemical Weapons

(a) Bilateral US/USSR perspective
Ambassador James Leonard
Former U.S. Deputy Special Negotiator
Middle East Peace Negotiations

(b) African perspective
Major-General Esmat A. Ezz
Egyptian Armed Forces (Retired)

Emerging issues in disarmament: conversion and science and technology
Mr. Prvoslav Davinic
Chief, Monitoring, Analysis, and Studies Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: current perspectives
Ambassador Chusei Yamada
Ambassador of Japan to Egypt
and
Ambassador James Leonard
Former U.S. Deputy Special Negotiator
Middle East Peace Negotiations

Thursday, 10 May

10:00 - 14:00 **Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and IAEA safeguards**
Dr. Aly El Saeidy
Head, Egyptian Power Station Authority

The work of the World Disarmament Campaign and regional centres for peace and disarmament
Ms. Angela Knippenberg
Co-ordinator, World Disarmament Campaign
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Disarmament, development and security: a United Nations perspective
Mr. Prvoslav Davinic
Chief, Monitoring, Analysis and Studies Branch
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
and

Ms. Angela Knippenberg
Co-ordinator, World Disarmament Campaign
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs

Legal aspects of disarmament negotiations
Dr. Mounir Zahran
Director, International Organizations Department
Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs





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